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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-incrimination
Applicable to States-Federal Standard Determinative
Petitioner, who had been previously arrested during a gambling
raid,' was subpoenaed sixteen months later to be a witness in a state
inquiry into gambling and other criminal activities. He refused to
answer a number of questions2 related to events surrounding his
previous arrest, claiming a privilege under the fifth amendment.
The Connecticut Superior Court adjudged him in contempt and
committed him to prison until he was willing to answer. His application for habeas corpus was denied by the superior court, and the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed, holding that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not available to
a witness in a state proceeding, that the fourteenth amendment
extends no privilege to him, and that he had not properly invoked the
privilege available under the Connecticut Constitution. 3 On writ of
certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. The
fourteenth amendment makes the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applicable to the states; the privilege, if properly
invoked in a state proceeding, is governed by federal standards and,
judged by these standards, the petitioner's claim of privilege should
have been upheld. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Since the decision in Twining v. New Jersey,4 the United States
Supreme Court has consistently refused to apply the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Until the instant decision, this view had been followed
in cases whenever the question had arisen.5 Whatever doubt there
1. Malloy pleaded guilty to the crime of pool selling, a misdemeanor in violation of
CoNx. Gm' . STAT. REv. § 53-295 (1958), and was sentenced to one year in jail and
fined $500. The sentence was suspended after ninety days, at which time he was
placed on probation for two years.

2. The questions put to Malloy at the inquiry were in substance: (a) For whom did
he work on September 11, 1959, the date he was arrested on the charge for which
he was convicted? (b) Who selected and paid his counsel in connection with that
charge and his defense? (c) Who selected his bondsman and who paid him? (d) Who
paid Malloy's fine? (e) What was the name of the tenant in the apartment in which
he was apprehended? (f) Did he know John Bergotti?
3. Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963).
4. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
5. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97
(1934). In the latter case the Court said, "The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is
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may have been as to the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to the states was seemingly dispelled in
Adamson v. California,6 where the Court said that the privilege is
not inherent in the right to a fair trial. Despite the Court's refusal to
apply the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the
states, it did hold, in Brown v. Mississippi,7 that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from using an
accused's coerced confessions against him. In subsequent decisions8
the inquiry was whether the person had been compelled to incriminate
himself in violation of due process.9 In Mapp v. Ohio,10 the Court
applied the fourth amendment protection of unreasonable searches
and seizures to the states. Relying on Boyd v. United States," which
considered the fourth and fifth amendments as running "almost into
each other,"'12 the Court found that the fourth amendment protection
was intimately related to the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 13 Whenever one of the first eight amendments of the
Bill of Rights has been applied to the states there has been a
correlative finding that the federal constitutional standards accompanying that right also apply.' 4 In cases dealing with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the federal standard is the
free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception
of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Id. at 105. The fifth amendment requirements of grand jury indictments, Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and double jeopardy, Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), have also been held not to apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
6. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Mr. Justice Black vigorously dissented on the grounds that
the fourteenth amendment incorporated the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 68.
7. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Court, however, said that its conclusion did not
involve the privilege against self-incrimination. "Compulsion by torture to extort a
confession is a different matter." Id. at 285.
8. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
9. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). "[Tlhat ours is an accusatorial and
not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by
evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge
against an accused out of his own mouth." Id. at 541.
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Id. at 630. This view, put forth in the Boyd case, has been severely criticized.
8 WMmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940); Knox, Self-Incrimination, 74 U. PA. L.
REv. 139 (1926).
13. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 10, at 656-57.
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to counsel guaranteed
by the sixth amendment); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures of the fourth amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (guarantees of the
first amendment).
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"link in the chain" of evidence rule. 5
In the instant case, the Court reviewed decisions that had applied
various provisions of the Bill of Rights to state action which had
formerly been held not applicable. 16 It then reviewed the decisions
which prohibited the states from using the accused's coerced confessions against him.17 Recognizing that one of the basic premises of
our system of criminal prosecution is that the accused must not be
compelled to incriminate himself, the Court viewed the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as so fundamental that it
prevents the states from imprisoning a person in order to compel
him to answer questions that might incriminate him.' 8 The Court
strengthened its conclusion by referring to Mapp, which held that
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures was inadmissible in state
courts, and that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination implemented the fourth amendment in such cases. 19 The Court
then proceeded to reject the state's contention that the federal
standard in state inquiries is less stringent than in a federal proceeding
by citing cases that demonstrate that where the fourteenth amendment implements one of the first eight amendments the federal
standard is also applied to the states. 20 After applying the federal
standard to the questions asked the petitioner, the Court concluded
that the standard had not been applied because the Connecticut
court failed to take into consideration the circumstances and setting
in which the questions were asked.2 ' In his dissenting opinion, Mr.
Justice Harlan objected to the application of federal criminal procedures to state proceedings. He felt that the Court was overlooking
the significant differences between state and federal criminal law
15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). "The privilege afforded not
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute . . . [Ilf the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove
the hazard . . . he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Id. at 486-87.
16. 378 U.S. at 5-6. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 14 (sixth amendment); Mapp
v. Ohio, supra note 10 (fourth amendment); Gitlow v. New York, supra note 14
(first amendment).
17. 378 U.S. at 5-6.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 10. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
21. The Court stated that even though the one-year statute of limitations had run
on Malloy's past known offenses. His answers might link him with a more recent
crime for which he still might be prosecuted. Id. at 12-14. See the quotation from
Hoffman o.United States in note 15 supra.
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enforcement.22 He proceeded to cite the cases 23 in which the Court
had previously held that the privilege as such did not apply to the
states, and disapproved this overruling of a long line of precedent.
Mr. Justice Harlan felt that the relevant inquiry was whether the
proceedings below met the demands of fundamental fairness which
due process embodies. 24 In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
White, while agreeing with the majority that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination should be applied to the states,
felt that the Connecticut court had applied the prevailing federal
standard, but that the majority had in effect now made the privilege
automatic simply by the witness's invocation of it.2 He would
prefer a standard that allowed the judge rather than the witness to
determine when an answer sought is incriminating, or, at the very
least, a standard requiring the claimant to state his grounds for
26
asserting the privilege when asked seemingly innocuous questions.
In light of the decisions holding that the first, 27 fourth s8 and
sixth2 9 amendments apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment, it seems that the decision in the present case was inevitable.
With the many pronouncements describing our criminal system as
accusatorial, 30 the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is as "fundamental" to this system as the others, and should
be protected against state action. Although the Court has still not
accepted Mr. Justice Black's view that the fourteenth amendment
incorporates the first eight amendments, 31 it seems to be accomplishing the same result by picking and choosing those rights that are
"fundamental." The major difficulty with the application of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states, as with
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, is its tendency to weaken the federal system. This was ably
described by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion.32
22. 378 U.S. at 14-16. The most significant differences relate to the vastly greater
resources of the federal government, and the skill and education of its law enforcement
agents.
23. Id. at 17. Mr. Justice Harlan cited the following: Cohen v. Hurley, supra note
5; Adamson v. California, supra note 6; Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 5; Brown v.
Mississippi, supra note 7; Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra note 5; and Twining v. New
Jersey, supranote 4.
24. 378 U.S. at 28.
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 38.
27. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 14; Gitlow v. New York, supra note
14.
28. Ker v. California, supra note 14; Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 10.
29. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 14.
30. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, supra note 9.
31. See note 6 supra.
32. "The Court endangers this allocation of responsibility for the prevention of
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Until this decision the federal courts seem to have experienced
no real difficulty in their application of the federal standard. 33 The
lower federal courts have allowed the claim of the privilege if the
witness can show any connection, not wholly incredible, between an34
answer to a question and a crime for which he might be prosecuted.
The Court in the instant case upheld a claim of the privilege even
though the state demonstrated that petitioner could not be prosecuted
for the activities that his answers might uncover because the one-year
statute of limitations had run both on the misdemeanor and the
conspiracy to commit it. If there is strict adherence to this decision,
it will have the practical effect of allowing any witness to refuse to
answer any question. The fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination must be balanced with the right of the state to the
testimony of her citizens. This decision leaves the role of the judge
in much doubt because under the existing standard the witness'
claim is not final, and yet the judge can never determine conclusively
that an answer could not possibly incriminate, as seems to be required
by the Court in this decision. Thus, the states are now burdened
with the problem of the nature of the current status of the federal
standard and the guidelines thereunder. A possible solution would be
to return to the reasonable-tendency-to-incriminate test laid down in
Mason v. United States.36 In the last analysis it appears that the Court

simply determined that the time was ripe to apply the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states, even though
it was presented with a poor set of facts for such an application. If
there is a frank recognition of this motive, perhaps the predicted
confusion concerning the standards will not occur.
crime when it applies to the States doctrines developed in the context of federal law
enforcement, without any attention to the special problems which the States as a
group or particular States may face. If the power of the States to deal with local
crime is unduly restricted, the likely consequence is a shift of responsibility in this
area to the Federal Government, with its vastly greater resources. Such a shift, if it
occurs, may in the end serve to weaken the very liberties which the Fourteenth
Amendment safeguards by bringing us closer to the monolithic society which our
federalism rejects." 378 U.S. at 28.
33. Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Doto,
205 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
34. See, e.g., Isaacs v. United States, supra note 33. "To warrant a denial of the
privilege it must appear in the setting in which the question is asked that the answer
cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate." 256 F.2d at 658.
35. The sixth question seemed to be directed at one John Bergotti's activities rather
than his own, and the Court has stated that the protection against self-incrimination
is solely for the benefit of the witness and not for the protection of others. See Rogers
v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
36. 244 U.S. 362 (1917). Although Mason has not been expressly overruled, the
Court in Hoffman, supra note 15, after mentioning Mason, went on to say that a mere
possibility is sufficient.
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Criminal Law-Habeas Corpus Relief Where
Subsequent Decisions Reveal Prejudicial
Error in Original Sentence
Petitioner was found guilty of a rape-murder and, pursuant to a
penalty trial, sentenced to death.' The verdict of the penalty trial was
appealed to the California Supreme Court. There, petitioner made
two allegations of error: (1) that the prosecuting attorney had
introduced testimony indicating that there was a possibility of early
release from prison on parole if only a life sentence were given, and
(2) that the trial judge had informed the jury that even if a death
sentence were given, it could still be commuted by the Governor.
These alleged errors were held not to be prejudicial, and the death
penalty was affirmed.2 Within one year, other cases overruled certain
portions of the decision in petitioner's penalty trial appeal, in effect
holding that such errors were prejudicial. 3 On subsequent application
to the California Supreme Court for writ of habeas corpus to review
petitioner's sentence of death, held, reversed and remanded for a new
penalty trial. Where appellate review has been exhausted, habeas
corpus can properly be used to reconsider a prisoner's case on the
basis of decisions subsequent to the original sentence. In re Jackson,
39 Cal. Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420 (1964).
The common law writ of habeas corpus was originally used to
bring persons before the bar whose presence was necessary to the
conduct of court proceedings. 4 By the end of the fifteenth century
it was used by common law courts in asserting their jurisdiction over
rival courts, becoming a procedure for protecting a convicted defendant from penalty judgment at the hands of a court lacking proper
jurisdiction. 5 Traditionally, in most American jurisdictions, the writ
has been properly used only in testing the legality of imprisonment
by challenging jurisdictional defects.6 However, a majority of the
1. California penal law provides for a separate penalty trial if the defendant is

first found guilty of an offense for which the penalty is death, or in the alternative,
life imprisonment. CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1.
2. People v. Jackson, 59 Cal. 2d 375, 379 P.2d 937 (1963).
3. In People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33 (1964), the California Supreme
Court expressly overruled holdings in prior cases that references to possibility of

parole or to the Governor's power of commutation were not prejudicial. In subsequent cases heard on appeal such errors have thus been held prejudicial. People v.

Terry, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381 (1964); People v. Hines, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622,
390 P.2d 398 (1964).
4. 1 HoLDswonRT, HisToRY oF ENGLISH LAw 227 (3d ed. 1922).
CoLum. L. REv. 681, 682 (1961).

5. Ibid.

See also Note, 61

6. A habeas corpus proceeding renders void a conviction by a court without competent jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter has
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courts have broadened the use of habeas corpus, making a denial of
the defendant's constitutional rights grounds for its issuance.7 This is
on the theory that a court acting unconstitutionally has no jurisdiction
to proceed." Use of the writ has also been expanded to extend relief
to those imprisoned under unconstitutional statutes, the theory being
that an unconstitutional statute has no effect at all and a court is
without authority to imprison one who has violated no law.9 Beyond
this, no general statement can be made other than that some jurisdictions now permit the use of habeas corpus in exceptional circumstances to hear a matter of sufficient importance which could not
otherwise be reviewed. 10 Thus far, such exceptional circumstances
have included applications to attack convictions under a habitual
criminal statute where the status of the conviction depended upon a
prior conviction of a crime which did not conform to the definition
of any offense enumerated in the habitual criminal statute." Another
example is where there has been a denial of right to effective counsel
in a state criminal trial. 2 In general it can be said that exceptional
circumstances include any situation where a conviction has been
obtained under circumstances which perpetrate a grave injustice on
the accused.13
always been grounds for issuance of the writ. Ex parte Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 360
P.2d 43 (1961); Bowen v. Johnston, 58 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Cal), aft'd, 146 F.2d
268 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 876 (1944); Buie v. King, 50 F. Supp. 952
(W.D. Mo. 1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1943). However, as will be seen, some
jurisdictions have expanded these grounds and allow the writ to be used to question
a conviction for other than strictly jurisdictional reasons. See note 10 infra.
7. Minnesota v. Barker, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); Ex parte Bailey, 155 Cal.
472, 101 Pac. 441 (1909); O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S.W. 449
(1908).
8. Wojculewicz v. Cummings, 145 Conn. 11, 138 A.2d 512, cert. denied, 356 U.S.

969 (1958).

9. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte Schatz, 307 Mo. 67, 269 S.W.
383 (1925); Ex parte Rosenblatt, 19 Nev. 439, 14 Pac. 298 (1887); Servonitz v. State,
133 Wis, 231, 113 N.W. 277 (1907). See also Note, 61 CoLtzm. L. REv. 681, 689
(1961).
10. "The newer view is that a judgment may be void and thereby subject to attack
for certain extreme irregularities other than the lack of jurisdiction of the offense and
the person after the judgment or sentence." (Citations omitted.) Rice v. Davis, 366
S.W.2d 153, 155 (Ky. 1963) (denial of counsel). See also Bowen v. Johnston, 306
U.S. 19 (1939) (Conflict between state and federal authorities on a question of law);
In re McInturff, 37 Cal. 2d 876, 236 P.2d 574 (1951) (habitual criminal statute);
Granucci, Review of Criminal Conviction by Habeas Corpus in California, 15 HAszncs
L.J. 189, 198 (1963).
11. In re McVickers, 99 Cal. 2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946).
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Although Gideon was decided on a
constitutional basis, it is representative of numerous state cases which permitted use
of habeas corpus, based on exceptional circumstances, to collaterally attack a conviction where there had been a denial of right to counsel.
13. Other instances where use of habeas corpus has been held proper even though
technically speaking there has been no jurisdictional defect include: A person's right
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The court in the instant case chose to liberalize further the use of
habeas corpus in California by finding that there were exceptional
circumstances which justified use of the writ as a proper post-conviction remedy. It recognized as a matter of general law that habeas
corpus applies only to questions of imprisonment as a result of a
void proceeding or a jurisdictional defect and to review the constitutionality of statutes-not to correct error. 14 However, the court relied
on various apparent dicta 15 to justify its conclusion that habeas corpus
was proper "to review a matter that cannot otherwise be reached ...
16
where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ.., is apparent."
A large portion of the opinion was directed to justifying the retroactive
effect of its holding. It dealt with virtually every important case in
this area, distinguishing or criticizing those which held habeas corpus
unavailable to review a conviction obtained prior to reinterpretation of
the law applying to the conviction, and reasoning by analogy from the
few cases which do allow a retroactive application of constitutional
case decisions via habeas corpus.' 7 The court did not hold that
to apply for relief from default in perfecting an appeal, In re Martin, 23 Cal. Rptr.
167, 373 P.2d 103 (1962); erroneous imposition of an excessive sentence, In re Morch,
180 Cal. 384, 181 Pac. 657 (1919); improper rendition of multiple sentences Neal v.
California, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960); and an erroneous conviction under
an inapplicable statute, In re Zerbe, 36 Cal. Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182 (1964).
14. 39 Cal. Rptr. at 221, 393 P.2d at 421.
15. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 1'9, 26-27 (1939); In re Silverstein, 52 Cal. App.
2d 725, 126 P.2d 962, 964 (1942).
16. 39 Cal. Rptr. at 222, 393 P.2d at 422.
17. In United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1946), where
defendant was prevented from offering a defense of improper draft classification in a
trial convicting him of failure to submit to introduction in the army, and nine months
after lapse of the time for appeal of his case, the United States Supreme Court held
in another case that such a defense could be offered, the court granted habeas corpus,
holding that the defendant was entitled to review of his case in order to prevent a
complete miscarriage of justice. The United States Supreme Court reversed in Sunal
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947), saying that this was not a case where the law had
changed but was rather a situation where the definitive ruling on the question of law
had not crystalized and by failing to pursue an appeal, the defendant had lost his right
to relief. The court, in Jackson, distinguished this case on the basis that the rule of law
involved had crystalized and the defendant had exhausted his right of appeal.
In Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the court held that an
overruling decision of the United States Supreme Court was not applicable to an
earlier case decided under old law. Because of the date of the case and because it
was the only clear holding of its kind, the court in Jackson did not seem to consider
it persuasive authority.
In Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958),
the Supreme Court directed the state court to hear defendant's petition for habeas
corpus where he had been imprisoned as a result of an appeal in which the state
refused to furnish him a free transcript of the trial court record. The direction was on
the basis of an overruling case which held that an indigent defendant had a constitutional right to a free transcript on appeal. The court in Jackson relied on this logic
of applying an overruling case decision retroactively to a conviction obtained prior to
the overruling case. 38 Cal. Rptr. at 225, 393 P.2d at 425.
In Gaitan v. United States, 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961), the court denied habeas
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habeas corpus is an available remedy to apply retroactively to all
convictions under old law, where subsequent cases have changed the

law making such similarly obtained subsequent convictions invalid. It
merely held that this particular case, on its facts, was a sufficiently
exceptional situation to justify the use of habeas corpus, that "this
is a fixed group of cases and none hereafter will be added to their

number."' 8 The resulting opinion in the case seems to be the product

of the court's response to two separate forces. The first was the
necessity for using habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from the
grave injustice resulting from obviously exceptional circumstances.
The second force was the court's reluctance to make a broad holding
that habeas corpus could be used to retroactively apply all overruling cases to prior convictions. It was as a result of these two

forces that the court strictly limited the case to its facts.
This case is important in that it points up the distinction between
two distinct situations: (1) when habeas corpus can be used to
retroactively' 9 apply an overruling case decision in collaterally attacking a conviction obtained under prior law, and (2) when a change
in the law will be applied retrospectively to fact situations occurring
before the change, but not litigated until afterwards. ° In the second
corpus relief to a defendant convicted before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
which held that the circumstances leading to a conviction such as in defendant's case
gave such a defendant a constitutional right to release. The court in Jackson said that
the circumstances involved in that case and Jackson's were totally different. 39 Cal.
Rptr. at 224, 393 P.2d 424 n.6.
18. 39 Cal. Rptr. at 224, 393 P.2d at 424.
19. For purposes of this discussion the word "retroactively" will be used when
referring to situations where overruling case law is applied to attack a conviction
which was obtained prior to the overruling case. "Retrospectively" will be used when
referring to situations where overruling case law is applied in a trial held subsequent
to the overruling case but relating to facts occurring prior to that case.
20. Whether a case reinterpretation of law should be applied retroactively to fact
situations occurring before the change but litigated afterwards has constantly perplexed
courts. The theory behind retroactive application of the law is that in overruling cases,
judges do not make law but merely discover what has always been the law, though it
had been misrepresented. The problem with retrospective application is that parties
often plan their legal relationships in reliance on the stated existing law. This is
especially true in the formation of contracts. If the lav is subsequently changed the
legal consequences flowing from the prior actions of the parties are also changed. This
often leads to harsh consequences in individual cases with the result that courts are
persuaded to limit retrospective application of overruling decisions where parties have
relied on prior law. The result of this has been that in some cases courts apply the
law retrospectively while in others they refuse to do so.
The situation where overruling case decisions are applied retrospectively to fact
situations occurring before the change but not litigated until after is to be distingushed
from collateral attack of a conviction which was obtained before the overruling case.
In this situation the courts have been very strict in allowing the use of habeas corpus
to retroactively apply the overruling case to prior convictions under old law. Only
where the conviction was obtained under a statute later determined unconstitutional
or, in some cases, where the prior conviction was obtained under circumstances which
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situation, in criminal cases where an individual's life or liberty hangs
in the balance, the courts' decision of whether or not to retrospectively
apply overruling case law often will depend upon the resulting consequences of this decision to the particular defendant. The courts will
generally apply the new decision in such a way as to insure protection of the defendant's life and liberty.2 ' Should not the same considerations apply in allowing a defendant convicted under prior law
but before the overruling case collaterally to attack his conviction
via habeas corpus where life or liberty hang in the balance? As
has been said, habeas corpus is available to attack collaterally a
conviction under an unconstitutional statute,1 or in some situations
where the conviction was obtained in violation of a constitutional
right, where the decision as to constitutionality came after the convictionPm This case is an example of the first situation mentioned
above: the defendant has been sentenced to death, the law is changed
indicating that the procedure so depriving him of life was prejudicial,
and under prevailing habeas corpus law, he was prevented from collaterally attacking this procedure. Although the overruling case was
not of a constitutional dimension, this fact alone should not prevent
his collateral attack of a procedure where he has been prejudicially
sentenced to death. 24 In limiting the availability of habeas corpus to
retroactively apply a non-constitutional overruling case to these facts,
are found in the later overruling case to deny constitutional rights, has collateral
attack of the conviction been permitted. See Note, 60 HARv. L. RExv. 437 (1947);
Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REv. 199, 207-09 (1940);
Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MCII.
L. REv. 30 (1939).
21. Thus in State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940), where a prior
decision had construed a criminal statute as not applying to certain conduct and the
defendant had engaged in such conduct before the prior decision was overruled, the
overruling case was confined to prospective operation. However, when a person is
convicted under a statute declared unconstitutional after his conviction, the conviction
can not stand. See note 9 supra. Note, 60 H.nv. L. REv. 437, 446 (1947).
22. See note 9 supra.
23. See note 7 supra. The cases in note 7 refer to situations where the defendant
was denied a constitutional right in the trial which resulted in his imprisonment; this
denial allowing him to collaterally attack the conviction via habeas corpus. Here,
reference is made to a somewhat different situation where the holding that circumstances occurring in a trial are unconstitutional is in another case arising after a conviction which included such circumstances and is now being collaterally attacked. In
this situation collateral attack of the prior conviction has been permitted on the basis
of a subsequent overruling case of a constitutional dimension. See Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). There is currerntly
one argument which would permit collateral attack of convictions obtained under
circumstances which were held unconstitutional in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
but were rendered before Mapp. See 18 VAND. L. REv. 762 (1964).
24. In light of the recent emphasis placed upon the protection of personal rights by
most courts, this resulting situation could well be found to be of a constitutional
dimension. To submit the defendant to the death penalty under such circumstances
may be a denial of his life without due process of law.
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the court created a single exception to the current general rule which
limits such a procedure to situations where the overruling case was of
a constitutional dimension. This reluctance to create a broad exception to the general rule, which limits collateral attack of prior convictions, was probably based on the same considerations which
account for such a strict general rule. The foremost of these considerations include crowded court dockets resulting from the possibility of numerous retrials and the difficulty in witnesses being found
and once found, able to recall events relevant to the old trial.25 The
problem in such an application of habeas corpus as was used in the
instant case is how to determine when there is a sufficiently grave
injustice warranting such an exception to the rule and allowing
retroactive application of the overruling case law. This court26said that
it is only where life is in jeopardy. It seems more logical

to limit

retroactive habeas corpus relief to situations where the redefinition
of the law is of a constitutional dimension.

Criminal Law-Probable Cause and Fourth
Amendment Guarantees as Applied
to State Parolees
The parole officer of the defendant, a paroled California prisoner,
accompanied by narcotics officers who had received information
from an undisclosed informer' that the defendant had heroin in his
possession, apprehended the defendant and searched his person and
his automobile for the heroin. The parole officer had no arrest or
search warrant and later testified that he had arranged the meeting
with the defendant for the sole purpose of searching him for narcotics. 2 During the defendant's trial for possession of narcotics, the

court admitted into evidence the heroin that had been found in his
automobile and upon his person. The defense counsel objected to
this admission on the grounds that the evidence was the product
25. See, Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650 (1962); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States, 1962 Dunn L.J. 319 (1962).
26. It seems quite illogical to have a general rule which admittedly satisfactorily
deals with the problem and then create a single exception to this rule for one case
which could probably be included within the general rule on the basis of a denial of
due process.
1. This anonymous communication was the only basis of probable cause for the
search.
2. People v. Hernandez, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1964).
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of an illegal search and seizure, and also demanded disclosure of
the identity of the police informer. The objection was overruled
and the parolee-defendant was found guilty. On appeal to the California district court, held, affirmed. The requirement of probable
cause under the state and federal constitutions does not apply to the
search of a parolee or his automobile by parole officers, acting on
information received from an undisclosed informer. People v. Hernandez, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964).
Parole has been defined as "the release of a prisoner to the community by the parole board prior to the expiration of his term, subject
to conditions imposed by the board and to its supervision."3 Another
view is that parole is "a treatment program in which an offender, after
serving part of a term in a correctional institution, is conditionally
released under supervision and treatment by a parole worker." 4 The
purpose of parole is widely recognized as the rehabilitation of the
offender. One court has observed, "The parole system is reformatory
and founded upon a plan and policy of helping the inmate to gain
strength and resistance to temptation, to build up his self control, to
adjust his attitudes and actions to social controls and standards; and
it aims to extend his liberties and opportunities for normal living.... 5
The parole officer is often viewed as having two essential goals-a
short term goal of insuring that the parolee obeys the term or conditions of his parole, and a long term goal of assisting the parolee in
planning his future so that he can lead a normal and productive life.
The long term goal stresses the importance of dealing with the parolee
as an individual with his own rights. 6 Although the object of parole,
i.e., rehabilitation, is clear, the theory upon which a parole is granted
is not so clear. Today there are two major concepts concerning the
granting of a parole: first that it is an act of grace on the part of the
state,7 and second, that it is a form of contract 8 between the state
3. STANDARD PROBATION AND PAROLE ACT § 2 (1955).

4. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND ThEonY oF PROBATION A"D PARoLE 44 (1959).

One

authority referred to parole as the "selective process of releasing a prisoner at the
psychologically right time when, in the judgment of the releasing authority, he has

received maximum benefit from his institutional experience."
ParoleViolation Hearings,27 Fed. Prob., June 1963, p.38 .

Reed, Due Process in

5. McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721, 722 (1945).

6. Zeitoun, Parole Supervision and Self-Determination, 26 Fed. Prob., Sept. 1962,
pp. 44, 49. California authorities observe that, "The parole agent helps with 'material

assistance, vocational guidance, job placement, adjustment within the community . . .
and will counsel the parolee in regard to whatever social, marital or personal problems
the parolee may have."' California Department of Corrections, BIENNIAL REPORT 35
(1957-58), quoted in MacGregor, Adult Probation, Parole, and Pardon in California,
38 Tmus L. Rsv. 887, 902 (1960).

See also Ives, The Essential Task of the Probation-

Parole Officer, 26 Fed. Prob., March 1962, p. 38.
7. "His release is a matter of grace, not a right to be demanded." State v. Brantley,
353 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Mo. 1962). See Berry v. State Board of Parole, 148 Colo. 547,
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and the offender. The concept of grace is definitely the majority
holding. Under both of these theories the question that is crucial in
the determination of the parolee's civil rights is that of his legal position in relation to the state. A study of recent decisions shows that a
majority of states regard the parolee as being in the legal custody of

the state.9 Whatever it may be called-legal custody, technical custody, 10 or constructive custodyll-the effect is the same: the parolee

is considered as remaining a prisoner, 12 serving his sentence outside
the prison walls or being on "a leave of absence."' 3 Some states pro-

vide that the warden of the prison from which the parolee is released
still has custody' 4 of him, while others specify the parole board1"

367 P.2d 338; People v. Kinney, 25 Ill.
2d 491, 185 N.E.2d 337 (1962); Willard
v. Ferguson, 358 S.W.2d 516 (Ct. App. Ky. 1962); State v. Kalkbrenner, 263 Minn.
396, 116 N.W.2d 560 (1962); State v. Powell, 139 Mont. 583, 367 P.2d 553 (1961);
Owens v. Swope, 60 N.M. 71, 287 P.2d 605 (1955); People v. Langella, 41 Misc.
2d 65, 244 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1963); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 200 Pa. Super. 254, 188
A.2d 780 (1963); Bearden v. State, 223 S.C. 211, 74 S.E.2d 912 (1953).
8. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa
569, 100 N.W. 510 (1904); Townsend v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 645, 383 P.2d 954 (1963);
Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 131 N.W. 914 (1911); Rider v. McLeod, 323 P.2d
741 (Okla. Crim. 1958); Wilson v. State, 240 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951);
In re Saucier, 122 Vt. 168, 167 A.2d 368 (1961). See Note, 65 HtMv. L. REV. 309,
310 (1951). The author of this note lists a third important concept, "the parolee
remains in the custody of the warden of the prison or parole board." It is suggested
that this is not an accurate classification since this constructive custody concept occurs
under both the "grace" and "contract" theories. E.g., Ir.,re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340,
142 N.E.2d 846 (1957); Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Parole, 409 Pa.
204, 185 A.2d 581 (1962).
9. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824 (1960); Tyler v. State Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 19 Wis. 2d 166, 119 N.W.2d 460 (1963).
10. Espinoza v. Tinsley, 390 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1964).
11. Baumhoff v. United States, 200 F.2d 769, (10th Cir. 1952); People v.
Hernandez, supra note 2; Schooley v. Wilson, 150 Colo. 483, 374 P.2d 353 (1962);
Bush v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 207, 192 N.E.2d 774 (1963); Application of
Fredericks, 211 Ore. 312, 315 P.2d 1010 (1957).
12. "In respect of that crime and his attitude before the law after conviction of
it he is not a citizen, nor entitled to invoke the organic safeguards which hedge about
the citizen's liberty, but he is a felon at large by the mere grace of the Executive."
Fuller v. State, supra note 8, at 40, 26 So. at 148, cited with approval by the court
in In re Varner, supra note 8.
13. Parole is a "leave of absence from prison during which the prisoner remains
in legal custody until the expiration of his sentence." Sanders v. MacDougall, 135
S.E.2d 836, 837 (S.C. 1964).
14. Jenkins v. Madigan, 211 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1954); Williams v. City of Birmingham, 41 Ala. App. 208, 133 So. 2d 713 (1961); Overlade v. Wells, 234 Ind.
436, 127 N.E.2d 686 (1955); Cf. STANDARD PROBATION AND PAROLE ACT § 18, "Every
prisoner while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of the institution from which
he was released but shall be subject to the orders of the board."
15. People v. Dene, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956); Farrant v. Bennett,
123 N.W.2d 888 (Iowa 1963); State v. Rigg, 256 Minn. 275, 98 N.W.2d 243 (1959);
Petition of LaDoux, 393 P.2d 778 (Mont. 1964); Greenwood v. Gladden, 231 Ore.
436, 373 P.2d 417 (1962); Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Parole, supra
note 8; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3614 (Supp. 1964). See Doyle v. Hampton, 207
Tenn. 399, 340 S.W.2d 891 (1960).
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as the custodian, but as far as the parolee is concerned the distinction
is meaningless. 16 The other legal theory concerning the parolee's
relation to the state is a minority view, and might be called the
"conditional release" approach. A typical statement of this view
is,
"A parole is a conditional release .. .which entitles the grantee to
leave the institution in which he is imprisoned, and to serve the
remainder of his term outside the confines thereof, if he shall satisfactorily comply with all the terms and conditions provided in the
parole order.""' Under this concept, the parolee is still under the
supervision of penal authorities, but he does not seem to be regarded
as an actual prisoner 8 with simply a wider area of confinement. 9
Before examining the civil rights of a parolee, it will be helpful to
review the field of search and seizure as applicable to the instant case.
The United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio2W held for the
first time that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
forbids the admission in state criminal trials of evidence procured in
violation of the prohibition of the fourth amendment against unreasonable search and seizure. The "exclusionary rule" had been previously adopted in California in 1955.21 A search without a warrant,
to be valid, generally must be made pursuant to a valid arrest, 2 or
with reasonable or probable cause.23 One commentator, critical of
California's broad interpretation of probable cause, has written, "The
crucial issue on which the California and federal courts part company
has to do with the standards to be used in defining a 'reasonable
search and seizure.' Only a handful of state decisions so much as
16. This is true particularly as regards his civil rights.
17. State v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d 150, 153

(1950).

See Marsh v.

Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1955); People v. Kinney, supra note 7; Willard v.
Ferguson, supra note 7; In re Cammarata's Petition, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677
(1954); State v. Brantley, supra note 7; Mahoney v. Parole Board, 10 N.J. 269, 90
A.2d 8 (1952); Nibert v. Carroll Trucking Co., 139 W. Va. 583, 82 S.E.2d 445
(1954).
18. See note 12 supra.
19. This would seem to be nearer the position advanced in the Model Penal Code.
See MODET PENAL CODE § 305.17, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956), "the conditions of parole should be as few, reasonable, and precise as possible. They should be
of a nature clearly relevant to the parolees' conformity to the requirements of the
criminal law. They should not intrude excessively or unnecessarily on the private life
of the individual."
20. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
22. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
23. Reasonable or probable cause has been defined as "A reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged." Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378, 381, 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944).
"It is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility." Smith v.
State, 191 Md. 329, 62 A.2d 287, 291 (1948). See People v. Aguilar, 34 Cal. Rptr.
524 (1963).
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mention Mapp or any other federal cases ... "24 California, however,
with, a minority of jurisdictionsas has instituted a judicial safeguard
that is important in the instant case. Under the doctrine of Priestly
v. Superior Ct.,2 the disclosure of the identity of a police informant
is required when his communication is relied upon as probable cause

for a warrantless search.27 The courts feel that this is necessary to
28
make the exclusionary rule effective.
There appear to have been only two jurisdictions that have considered the specific problem of the position of the parolee in relation
to the use of evidence obtained through invalid searches. In People v.
Denne,2 the California Supreme Court-using a doctrine of construc-

tive custody3Q---held that fourth amendment guarantees could be
asserted by a parolee, but that a warrantless search by the police
officer was reasonable because of the special relationship 3' between the
parolee and the authorities who supervise his conduct. In the

Robarge2 and Contrera3 3 cases, evidence was admitted that had been
found in the course of a search incidental to the apprehension of the
parolee for a parole violation. The Triche

case went even further

and allowed evidence to be introduced that was the product of a
warrantless search merely in the course of surveillance. A recent New
York caseP5 cites the Denne and Triche cases and observes, "Within
the spirit and intendment of the law, it seems plain that the test of
24. Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 STAN. L. REv. 318, 326-27
(1964). The author adds, "search and seizure rules fall below any reasonable
standard the United States Court might develop to implement Mapp v. Ohio. They
are systematically hostile to the defendant and in their total impact unfair." Id. at
349. See also, Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J.
319.
25. See United States v. Santiago, 327 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1964); Cochran v. United
States, 291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.
1932); Hill v. State, 151 Miss. 518, 118 So. 539 (1928); State v. Edwards, 317 S.W.2d
441 (Mo. 1958); Smith v. State, 169 Tenn. 633, 90 S.W.2d 523 (1936). But cf.
Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487 (1955).
26. 50 Cal. 2d 812. 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
27. "Aside from Hernandez's status as a prior narcotics offender, the anonymous
communication was the only component of probable cause for the search." People v.
Hernandez, supranote 2, at 102.
28. Priestly v. Superior Court, supra note 26, at 43. The opinion made a strong
reference to what it considered the federal rule as stated in Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957), "In these cases [helpful to a fair determination of the issue]
the Government has been required to disclose the identity of the informant unless
there was sufficient evidence apart from his confidential communication."
29. 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956).
30. See notes 9-12 supra.
31. See note 6 supra.
32. People v. Robarge, 151 Cal. App. 2d 660, 312 P.2d 70 (1957).
33. People v. Contreras, 154 Cal. App. 2d 321, 315 P.2d 916 (1957).
34. People v. Triche, 148 Cal. App. 2d 198, 306 P.2d 616 (1957).
35. People v. Langella, supra note 7.

1965 ]

RECENT CASES

reasonableness is not necessarily the same, when applied to a parolee,
as when applied to a person whose rights are not similarly circumscribed .... 36 In all of these cases there was a requirement of probable cause, but the protection afforded by this safeguard was
seriously limited since the courts felt that the degree of probable
cause required was lessened by the existence of the special relationship between the parolee and parole officer.
In the instant case the court realized that it was difficult to reconcile
the cases following Denne with the exclusionary rule and the Priestly
doctrine, but reasoned that the special relationship of parolee and
parole officer largely negated the necessity of strict adherence to the
customary safeguards of the accused. As the court observed, "Weighed
on the standard scale, the officer's entry into the automobile in a
37
direct quest for incriminating evidence possessed dubious legality."
The court went much further than those cases holding that the requirements for establishing probable cause may be less stringent in
the case of a parolee, 38 for here the court eliminated the need for
any probable cause where the special relationship of parolee and
parole officer exists. Since under these circumstances there is no
requirement of probable cause, the Priestly doctrine is held not to
apply and the informant can remain anonymous. In a strong application of the constructive custody concept, this court drew an analogy
between the parolee and the actual prisoner. 39 To justify the search,
it stated, "prison authorities may subject inmates to intense surveillance and search unimpeded by fourth amendment barriers. "40 The
court also advanced a public policy argument that close supervision
and control are requisites in making the parole system acceptable to
the public.41 The comparison drawn by the defense between the
rights of a probationer and of a parolee 42 was rejected by the court
since a probationer "never enters state prison and never suffers the
43
disabilities resulting from entry."
The court in the instant case completely avoided discussing several
important questions. This is particularly disturbing in light of its
statement:
Conceivably, the close scrutiny available to the parole authorities should
be restricted to the sphere of parole administration. The heroin in Hernandez' possession led to results other than parole revocation, serving as
36. Id. at 805.
37. People v. Hernandez, supra note 2, at 103.
38. People v. Langella, supra note 7.
39. People v. Hernandez, supra note 2, at 103.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.
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foundation for a fresh criminal prosecution and conviction. We would
assume that criminal prosecution of a parolee should be accompanied by
the procedural safeguards and guaranties attending criminal prosecutions
44
generally.

The court apparently recognized that the import of the above quoted
passage threw serious doubt on the very decision it had reached, but
attempted to justify its holding by reasoning that if the evidence was
lawfully obtained it was available to enforce any law which might
have been violated; 45 and that here the heroin was lawfully seized
and admitted since there was no requirement of probable cause for
the search. The court made the special relationship between parolee
and parole officer the key factor in its decision by stating, "There
is a marked legal distinction between arbitrary search by the parole
authorities whom the law places in control of the parolee and one by
general law enforcement officers." 46 The distinction therefore must
center about the special relationship between the parolee and parole
officer; yet here this special relationship should have been irrelevant
because the parole officer was not performing any unique function of
his office,47 but was merely accompanying the narcotics officer so as
to validate the search. Although it is recognized that a parole officer
has supervision of his parolee, it still seems that the exercise of what
the court admits is arbitrary power to arrest and convict for a new
crime is not justified by precedent or policy. The parolee, facing a
new prosecution, should be as much entitled to discover the identity
of the informer as any other defendant. Under the holding of this
case, the parolee stands deprived of the right to a judicial review of
the parole officer's search. The earlier California cases cited by the
court in support of their reasoning dealt with parole revocation and
not with the commission of a new crime. 48 The constructive custody
doctrine largely led to this result, for jurisdictions following this
view regard the parolee as a felon4 9 or actual prisoner. One authority
has stated, "Even if the parolee is constructively still a prisoner, this
still does not authorize either a search or an arrest without legal
cause." 50 Calling the doctrine of constructive custody an unnecessary
44. ibid.
45. People v. Denna, 40 Misc. 2d 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1963). "[Tihe
information . . . was not used or to be used by them to convict him of a crime,
but merely to recall a privilege."
46. People v. Hernandez, supra note 2, at 102 n.2.
47. See note 6 supra.
48. The court seems to overlook this distinction as it states "To weigh retaking
of a parolee on scales calibrated for standard cases of arrest and probable cause is to
compare incomparables." People v. Hernandez, supra note 2, at 103. Here, however,
there was not a "retaking," but an arrest for a new crime.
49. See note 12 supra.
50. Rubin, Due Process Is Required in Parole Revocation Proceedings, 27 Fed. Prob.,
June 1963, p. 44.
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legal fiction, he concludes, "if it encourages decisions that contradict
the essential purpose of parole-conditional liberty-it should be
abandoned."51 The court could have profitably spent more time in
considering the analogy drawn by the defense to the status of a
probationer to whom the fourth amendment protections apply.52 The

Supreme Court has stated that "Probation, like parole, 'is intended to
be a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to
society.'""u The court in the instant case dismissed the comparison
since a probationer has never been in prison. It would be more
appropriate to look at the status of the probationer and parolee after
they have both been granted their conditional liberty. At least four
important points of similarity are apparent: (1) the granting of both
a parole and probation is discretionary, (2) the purpose of both is
rehabilitation, (3) the nature of both types of release is conditional,(4) the judicial or administrative procedures generally followed are
comparable. The two acts appear comparable enough to warrant at
least more than a summary dismissal. The third point upon which the
court should have expanded concerns the Priestly doctrine that "Only
by requiring disclosure and giving the defendant an opportunity to
present contrary or impeaching evidence as to the truth of the officer's
testimony and the reasonableness of his reliance on the informer can
the court make a fair determination of the issue."55 It is difficult to
understand how the parolee-parole officer relationship makes "the
informer's identity... irrelevant, and his anonymity... no handicap
on the defense."m The holding in this case dangerously abrogates a
significant protection of an individual5 7 parolee who faces a trial for
a new crime. The court does this by placing undue reliance upon a
relationship that by its very nature should not abandon the parolee to
the use of arbitrary power by the individual to whom he looks for
assistance in adjusting to society.
51. Id. at 45.
52. These protections were held to apply to a probationer in Martin v. United

States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950).
53. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943), citing Zerbst v. Kidwell,
304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938).

54. "The word 'probation' by its very name implies that the probationer must
fulfill certain conditions to be entitled to the reward." People v. Municipal Court, 145
Cal. App. 2d 767, 772, 303 P.2d 375, 378 (1957).
55. Priestly v. Superior Court, supra note 26, at 50 Cal. 2d 812, 818.

56. People v. Hernandez, supra note 2, at 105.
57. To some extent there must be a balancing of the rights of the individual with

those of the public. The public policy argument of the court in the instant case to the

effect that the parolee must not be given normal civil rights in order to make the
parole system acceptable to the public does not seem to be fully enough developed.
In making this argument, the court should explain in more detail why the public

might need or expect such a limitation on the parolee. The court should particularly

define its position in cases such as these where the entire public's right to a trial free.

from evidence seized by arbitrary police power is endangered.
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Criminal Law-Retroactivity of Mapp
Exclusionary Rule
Petitioner was convicted of a narcotics violation in a New York
state court in 1951. During his trial evidence was admitted although
it was obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure. The
illegally obtained evidence was constitutionally admissible in state
courts under the view prevailing in the United States Supreme Court
at the time of the trial." But ten years later the Court, in Mapp v.
Ohio,2 overruled the earlier authority and held that evidence seized
unconstitutionally is not admissible in state courts. Petitioner then
instituted this federal habeas corpus proceeding, contending that the
exclusionary rule announced in Mapp applies retroactively. The
federal district court denied petitioner's writ.3 On an appeal, held en
banc, affirmed. The Mapp exclusionary rule does not apply retroactively to convictions on which the time for direct appeal had
expired before Mapp was decided. United States ex rel. Angelet v.

Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 815 (1964).
Legislation is usually prospective in operation and often must be
so under the ex post facto and impairment of contracts clauses. 4
Judicial decisions overruling earlier cases, however, have traditionally
been given retroactive application in both civil and criminal matters
(normally by the granting of new trials). 5 This is in deference to
the Blackstonian theory 6 that the judiciary never "makes" new law,
and that in overruling decisions it merely "declares" the previously existing law. Retroactivity is thus thought necessary from a jurisprudential standpoint since the holding of the earlier cases was, in fact, not
really law but a misinterpretation of the law.7 This principle has been

criticised in its application to civil matters by Austin 8 and Cardozo. 9
In their view, retroactivity is unjust in its application to those persons
who had acted in reliance upon the overruled law, and is unrealistic
1. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. The order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York is apparently unreported. It was entered on September 20, 1963 by Judge
Palmieri.
4. Gelpeke v. City of DuBuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175 (1863).
5. Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1
(1960).
6. I BLACKSTONE, Co
=rmr Es *69, *70.
7. Levy, supra note 5. According to the Blackstonian theory, Wolf never was law,
but was merely a misinterpretation of the law. Thus retroactivity would be required for
Mapp, since those persons convicted under Wolf were convicted under a misinterpretation of the law.
8. Discussed in CAntDozo, THE NATuRE or Tm JuDicrAL PnocEss, 124-25 (1921).
9. Id. at 124-25, 147-49.
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in its failure to recognize the judiciary's legitimate legislative function.
A number of state courts have reasoned similarly and denied retroactivity in civil cases. 10 In Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil Co."
the Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutional for a state
court to deny retroactivity to an overruling civil decision. In another
12
civil case, Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,
the Court indicated that in federal overruling decisions justice to the
parties and public policy would determine whether to apply decisions retroactively. These two cases make it clear that retroactivity
is not always constitutionally required for overruling civil decisions. The Supreme Court has not, however, indicated clearly whether
retroactivity is constitutionally required in all overruling criminal
decisions, or, if not, what factors it will use to determine when to
apply retroactivity. The Supreme Court has retroactively applied its
3
holdings that indigent defendants must be provided with counsel'
4
and with transcripts of trial court proceedings for appellate purposes.'
The Court has also held that the voluntariness of confessions must
be re-evaluated by subsequently developed standards.' 5 In none of
these cases, however, did the Court even discuss the retroactivity
issue; apparently it assumed that retroactivity should be granted.
For example, in the coerced confession case the district court recognized that under the present-day standards expounded in cases decided after petitioner's conviction, the confession would have to be
excluded, but it nevertheless declined to apply those cases retroactively. 16 The Supreme Court, however, held the confession inadmissible on the basis of the cases decided after petitioner's conviction
without even alluding to the problem of retroactivity. 7 One frequently suggested test for determining if overruling decisions are to
be applied retroactively is that retroactivity should be denied unless it
will advance the "purpose" of the overruling decision (hereafter referred to as the "purpose" test)."' Another test suggested is that
10. Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1891); Storrie v. Cortes,
90 Tex. 283, 38 S.W. 154 (1896).
11. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
12. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
13. E.g., Doughty v. Maxwel, 376 U.S. 202 (1964) (holding that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) applies retroactively).
14. Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (holding that Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) applies retroactively).
15. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
16. United States ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
17. Reck v. Pate, supra note 15.
18. Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp
v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. RE v. 650 (1962). See also Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 942
(1962): "In deciding whether to give a new rule retroactive effect, a court . . .first
should attempt to identify the purposes of the new rule, next should determine whether
on balance those purposes will be served by general retroactive application of the new
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"justice" to the individual defendant should be the prime consideration.19 The cases dealing with Mapp's retroactivity have reflected the
uncertainty of this area of the law.20 For example, the Fourth Circuit 21 relied upon the Blackstonian theory 22 and the trial transcript
case' in granting retroactivity. But the Fifth Circuit rejected the
Blackstonian theory, distinguished the trial transcript case, and
adopted the "purpose" test in denying retroactivity. 24 The Supreme
Court has on three occasisons applied the Mapp exclusionary rule
(without discussing the retroactivity issue) to convictions not yet
final at the time Mapp was decided.2 But these cases are often
distinguished (as they were in the instant case) on the ground that
since any one of them could have been the vehicle for overruling
the prior law, it would be unfair to deny relief 2simply because the
prior law was overruled at a slightly earlier date. 1
In the principal case the court, after first finding that there had
been an unreasonable search and seizure, concluded that the Supreme
Court had remained silent on the retroactivity of Mapp in order to
permit the lower courts to render an independent analysis of the
problem. 27 Rejecting the Blackstonian theory, the court adopts the
principle that overruling criminal decisions should not apply retrorule, and finally should decide whether these purposes will be promoted by retroactive
application of the new rule in the particular case before it."
19. "I feel assured, however, that its location . . . (the line of distinction behveen
retroactive and prospective application) will be governed, not by metaphysical conceptions of the nature of judge-made law, nor by the fetich of some implacable tenet,
such as that of the division of governmental powers, but by considerations of convenience, of utility, and of the deepest sentiments of justice." CARuozo, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 148-49. See Note, 60 HARv.L. REv. 437, 446 (1947); Note, 43 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1293-94 (1957).
20. Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963); Hall v. Warden 313
F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. Denied,374 U.S. 809 (1963); United States ex. tel. Linkletter
v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 930 (1964); Sisk v.
Lane, 219 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Hurst v. People of California, 211 F. Supp.
387 (N.D. Cal. 1962); Moore v. State, 41 Ala. 657, 146 So. 2d 734 (1962); In re
Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 366 P.2d 305 (1961); People v. Figueroa, 220 N.Y.S.2d 131
(Kings County Ct. 1961); Commonwealth ex tel. Wilson v. Rundle, 412 Pa. 109, 194
A.2d 143 (1963); Commonwealth ex. tel. Stoner v. Myers, 199 Pa. Super. 341, 185 A.2d
806 (1962).
21. Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
22. "It must be recognized that, since Weeks and Wolf, there had been no change in
the constitutional requirements of due process considered and found controlling in
Mapp. If the protections are there now, were they not present when Wolf was decided
and were they not present when Hall was tried, convicted and sentenced? An affirmative
answer would appear to be inescapable." Hall v. Warden, supra note 21, at 495.
23. Ibid.
24. United States ex tel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
granted, 377 U.S. 930 (1964).
25. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85
(1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
26. 333 F.2d at 15.
27. Id. at 15.
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actively unless retroactivity would better effectuate the "purpose"
of the new rule and the sound administration of the criminal law.2
In determining the "purpose" of the Mapp exclusionary rule the
court examined several state2 9 and federal 3 court decisions and concluded from them that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter the police from making future illegal seizures by rendering the
fruits of such seizures valueless in criminal proceedings. 3 1 It is then
reasoned that since the application of Mapp to pre-Mapp seizures
would have no effect on deterring future police misconduct, the
"purpose" of the new rule would not be advanced by retroactivity. m
Further, since illegality of seizure does not affect the reliability of evidence, the court assumes that most persons convicted with the aid of
illegally seized evidence are guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, and
that new trials would frequently result in acquittals due to the current
unavailability of the original evidence.n From ihis assumption it concluded that retroactivity would adversely affect the sound administration of the criminal law since it would result in the freeing of large
numbers of persons against whom legally obtained evidence sufficient
for conviction originally existed.- In this regard the Supreme Court's
granting of retroactivity in the cases where the defendants were convicted without counsel 5 was distinguished on the ground that, unlike
persons convicted upon illegally seized evidence,3 6 there is substantial
uncertainty of the guilt of persons convicted without the aid of counsel.37 The dissent contended that Mapp 38 held that there is a constitutional right not to be convicted upon unconstitutionally seized evidence. 39 It also pointed out that in a footnote'to Mapp4O the Court
28. Id. at 17-21.
29. E.g., "[Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inadmissible] because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with
v. Cahan,
the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers.... .People
44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955).
30. E.g. "[the exclusionary rule] is but a remedy which, by penalizing past official
misconduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future." 367 U.S. at 680
(dissenting opinion).
31. 333 F.2d at 19.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 20.
34. Ibid.
35. Doughty v. Maxwell, supra note 13.
36. 333 F.2d at 20.
37. Id. at 19.
38. "Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning
the enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, no less
important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people, would.
stand in marked contrast to all other rights declared as 'basic to a free society' . . . we
find that, as to the . . .States .. .the very least that .. . (the fourth and fourteenth
Amendments) . . .assure . . . is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 656-57.
39. 333 F.2d at 22.
40. 367 U.S. at 659 n.9.
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stated that the class of convictions possibly. affected by Mapp was
small when compared with its holding that indigent defendants must
be provided with trial transcripts for appellate purposes. From this
footnote it concluded that the Court considered the retroactivity problem, and intended to grant retroactivity.41 Finally, the dissent noted
that in all the cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt with the
problem of the retroactivity
of overruling criminal decisions it has
42
granted retroactivity.

The court's adoption and application of the "purpose" test as the
determining factor in deciding upon the retroactivity issue is subject
to serious criticism. First, the right to counsel cases, the trial transcript
cases, and the coerced confession case 43 establish that at least in
some situations persons have a constitutional right to have criminal
overruling decisions apply retroactively. When this right to retroactivity exists, it is a personal right of the person convicted under
the overruled law; and because this is a personal right its enforcement should depend upon its existence.44 But the "purpose" test
does not seek to determine the existence of this personal right, rather
it makes the enforcement of the right, if it exists, dependent upon
such unrelated factors as "will the police be deterred from making
future illegal searches and seizures"? Secondly, because there is often
great uncertainty as to the "purpose" of an overruling decision, the
"purpose" test makes a person's right to a new trial depend on which
of several plausible "purposes" a court happens to adopt. This defect
is well illustrated by the present case. It is no doubt true that one purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police from making unconstitutional seizures. But it is also true that the reason for deterring the
police is to insure that the right to privacy remains inviolate. Further,
the dissents contention that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
protect a defendant's right not to be convicted upon illegally seized
evidence is well founded. Each of these three "purposes" seems equally
plausible, but the "purpose" test would result in retroactivity if the
latter is recognized, but not if the first two purposes are recognized. The court's denial of retroactivity is also based upon the
conclusion that many persons against whom sufficient legally obtained
evidence sufficient for conviction originally existed would be acquitted
upon a new trial simply because the evidence is no longer available. It
is true that it would be unwise to acquit those persons against whom
legally obtained evidence sufficient for conviction originally existed.
41. 333 F.2d at 23.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Doughty v. Maxwell, supra note 13; Eskridge v. Washington, supra note 14;
Reck v. Pate, supra note 15.
44. Notes, supra note 19.
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But it seems manifestly unjust to deny new trials to those against
whom all the evidence is still available because in some other instances
the original evidence is no longer available. Further, even if this
element of unfairness is ignored, the court should determine whether
the actual number of persons who would be acquitted due to current
unavailability of evidence is large enough to justify the denial of
new trials to those persons against whom the original evidence is
still available. The court's denial of retroactivity is also subject to
criticism for its failure to distinguish the Supreme Court's granting of
retroactivity in the coerced confession case.45 In coerced confession
cases, as in illegal seizure cases, the Supreme Court has held that the
often present independent corroborative evidence has no bearing on
the issue of admissibility.4 But, despite the fact that in both types of
cases it is often clear that the defendants are guilty, the court has
failed to explain why the Supreme Court would deny retroactivity
in one case while requiring it in the other.47
The problem of whether to apply the Mapp exclusionary rule
retroactively seems to involve two main considerations. First, that
it is unfair to deny the protection of the exclusionary rule simply because the trial happened to occur before Mapp was decided. Second,
that it would be unwise to free those persons against whom there
once existed sufficient legally obtained evidence. But to incarcerate
persons against whom legally obtained evidence sufficient for conviction never existed simply because they were tried before the Mapp
decision is such a serious deprivation of the due process of law and
the equal protection of the laws (vis-a'-vis those persons tried after
Mapp) that the Supreme Court should hold that retroactivity is
constitutionally required. But, if the Court does not so hold, then
any test used to determine whether or not Mapp is to be applied
retroactively should have at its core justice to the defendant rather
than the effect retroactivity may have upon others.
45. Reck v. Pate, supranote 15.
46. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961).
47. It should be noted that the Sunburst-Chicot line of cases, in which the Supreme
Court denied retroactivity to civil overruling decisions, are of little or no value in
determining the Supreme Court's position on overruling criminal decisions. In civil
matters the prime reason for denying retroactivity is the prevention of injustice to those
persons who had changed their position in reliance on the overruled law. But in
criminal cases the element of "change of position" is lacking, and in its stead is the
overriding interest of justice to the accused.
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Decedent's Estates-Res Judicata Effect Upon Heir
Who Did Not Participate in Prior Will Contest
A beneficiary of decedent's will filed objections to the admission
to probate of the will charging that it was invalid on the grounds of
undue influence. The contestant failed to appear at the trial, which
culminated in a directed verdict for the proponents and the admission
of the will to probate. The present complainant, an heir at law who
allegedly had no notice of the death of decedent, seeks to contest the
will on the same grounds. The trial court held that the present
action is barred by the former adjudication. The Supreme Court of
Iowa held, reversed. An heir who was not made a party to a will
contest brought by another heir and who did not participate in any
way in the prior action is not bound by the result in the prior contest
on the theory of res judicata. In re Marty's Estate, 126 N.W.2d 303
(Iowa 1964).
It has been generally concluded by text writers and courts throughout the United States that the administration of a decedent's estate
is an in rem proceeding.' Since an in rem judgment is binding on
all persons as to their interests in a particular thing,2 it is res judicata
as to all subsequent actions affecting the same res, provided that the
jurisdictional and constitutional requirements of notice and a fair
hearing are satisfied. 3 Because the purpose of administering a decedent's estate is to determine to whom and in what quantity distributions are to be made, a single and final settlement is required. Yet
estate administration, by its nature, is a proceeding involving a series
of steps and a number of final decrees, 4 and, although the final
settlement may be classified as in rem, some of the individual steps
may reasonably be considered as in personam or quasi in rem.5 The
will contest,6 one of these steps, has been treated by the majority of
1. Simes, The Administration of a Decedents Estate as a Proceeding in Rem, 43
MrcH. L. Rev. 675 (1945).
2. RESTATEmENT, JUDGEMENTS § 32, comment a (1942).
3. Publication has been held on numerous occasions to satisfy notice requirements
for an in rem proceeding. It was the only type of notice given in the present case.
4. Simes, supra note 1, at 704.
5. Id. at 678. One example is a proceeding to sell the real estate of a decedent,
which has been classified as quasi in rem in Montana, Lamont v. Vinger, 61 Mont.
530, 202 Pac. 769 (1921), and in Idaho, Kline v. Shoup, 38 Idaho 202, 226 Pac. 729
(1923), and as in personam in Oklahoma, Seal v. Banes, 168 Okla. 550, 35 P.2d 704

(1934).
6. It has been described as "any proceeding or part of a proceeding in which the
question whether a given instrument is the duly executed and unrevoked will of a competent testator is put in issue." Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 Micn. L. REV.
503, 504-05 (1946). Mr. Simes indicates that the will contest is the common law
probate in solemn form where notice is given to interested parties who are permitted
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the courts as an in rem proceeding7 on the ground that the purpose
of probate is to establish the validity of a will in order to avoid the
inconvenience of having to prove it whenever relied upon and to
prevent the incongruous results of declared validity to some persons
but invalidity to others. 8 In a will contest the will must be authenticated and proved to have been duly executed by the deceased or
else shown to be invalid. 9 In either case there is no need for a
subsequent action on the same subject.
The holding in the present case that an unnotified heir is not bound
by a prior will contest is contrary to the weight of authority. The
court concluded that since a contest involves proponents and contestants, 10 it is essentially an adversary proceeding, and binds only
those who are parties to the judgment reached, and those who receive
notice but fail to utilize their opportunity to appear. The authority
relied upon was Stead v. Curtis," in which the court talked in terms
of the "conversion" of,a proceeding in rem into a personal suit due
to its "inter parties" character.' 2 While recognizing that this holding
subjects the proponents to a multiplicity of suits, the court considered this a consequence of their inadvertent failure to notify all of
the interested parties of the forthcoming contest. Once the contest
was held to be other than an in rem proceeding, the proponents, in'
order to support their claim- of res judicata, were required to prove
that both contestants were privies, and that the same issues and
causes of action were involved in both contests.' 3 The court stated that
in order to be privies one party must claim through the other,14 and
that the proponents failed to prove that this relationship existed.
The majority of courts have rejected' 5 both the result and the
reasoning of the present case, stating that the designation of certain
parties as plaintiffs and defendants has only a procedural effect, and
does not destroy the in rem nature of the action, which is the
to oppose the admission of the will, as contrasted to probate in common form where
no notice is required and no issues litigated.
7. McCann v. Ellis, 172 Ala. 60, 55 So. 303 (1911); In re Will of Storey, 20 InI.
App. 183 (1886); People ex rel. Frazer v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 198 (1878);
In re Estate of Sweeney, 94 Neb. 834, 144 N.W. 902 (1913); Hutson v. Sawyer, 104
N.C. 1, 10 S.E. 85 (1889); 57 Am. Jun. Wills § 932 (1948); AMmuCAN LAW OF
PnoERT § 14.35 (Casner ed. 1952); AraN~soN, Wrrs 516 (2d ed. 1953).
8. AsmicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.35 (Casner ed. 1952).
9. Ibid.
10. This argument arose because of statutes which provide that the contestant shall
be plaintiff and the proponent defendant. CAL. PROB. CODE § 371.
11. 205 Fed. 439 (9th Cir. 1913). See also Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co. v.
Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98 (1890); Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870).
12. 205 Fed. at 450.
13. In re Estate of Richardson, 250 Iowa 275, 93 N.W.2d 777 (1958).
14. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 788 (1947).
15. In re Relph's Estate, 192 Cal. 451, 221 Pac. 361 (1923).
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adjudication of the validity of the will itself, regardless of the parties.
These courts have been confronted with two other arguments against
the in rem characterization. The first involves statutory provisions
which extend the time in which contests may be brought by persons
suffering from a disability. 16 To allow a former action to be set aside
by a disabled party seems inconsistent with the "binding against the
whole world" concept. But the response has been that this does not
detract from the in rem character, and that it is binding on all except
the favored by-statute class. 17 Secondly, it has been noted that since

equity acts in personam, and many state statutes confer probate
jurisdiction on their chancery courts, the proceeding cannot be in
rem. 18 However, this theory has been repudiated on the premise
that since this is a statutory proceeding, it can be in rem regardless
of which court the legislature chooses to utilize.' 9
On the particular facts of this case, the court's decision was reasonable, but it represents a very narrow approach to the general
question of whether a will contest is an in rem proceeding. Undoubtedly, the court was greatly influenced by the fact that the
present contestant was an out of state citizen who had no knowledge
of decedents death, that he was a nephew of the decedent as were
the proponents, and that the first will contest was really no contest
at all. Under these circumstances it is obviously unfair to hold him
bound by a prior action in which he had no opportunity to protect
his interests. The inequities of this situation are further accentuated
by the possibility of collusion20 between the proponents and one who
is contesting the will simply to secure a judgment for the proponents.
Apparently the court's solution to the problem is to place the burden
of notifying all interested parties on the proponents of the will, and,
if they fail to fulfill this obligation, they must suffer the consequences. 2 ' While this approach may be justified in the present case,
the court's holding that a prior action is not res judicata to unnotified
16. Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 2d 551, 69 P.2d
921 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Spencer v. Spencer, 31 Mont. 631, 79 Pac. 320 (1905).
17. Simes, supra note 1, at 681.
18. Id. at 679.
19. Ex parte Walter, 202 Ala. 281, 80 So. 119 (1918); Woodville v. Pizzati, 119
Miss. 442, 81 So. 127 (1919); Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23 (1882).
20. There was no finding of collusion in the present case, but it could easily arise
under similar circumstances.
21. After the inception of this case the Iowa legislature attempted to alleviate
problems in this area by providing that "allknown interested parties who have not
joined with the contestants as plaintiffs in the action shall be joined with proponents
as defendants. When additional interested parties become known, the court shall order
them brought in as party defendants." IowA CODE ANN. § 633.311 (1964). This
legislation is not completely satisfactory because it does not concern itself with the
disposition of unknown parties or known interested parties which are inadvertently
overlooked.
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interested parties will prove to be unduly burdensome to the proponents and decidedly detrimental to the interests of society. It will
require the proponents, in order to fully protect themselves, to trace
the intestate successors of the decedent, however remote, a procedure
which would be expensive, time consuming, and always subject to
error. Certainly society has an interest in the settling of decedents'
estates as quickly as possible and with finality. As in the case of
actions to quiet title to real property,22 society is best served by the
conclusive establishment of ownership of property, in order that -the
property will be freely alienable and put to those uses which will
most benefit society. If the in rem effect is removed, then executors
naturally will be hesitant to make rapid distributions, and, if distributions are made, they will be made subject to the outcome of possible
future suits. These two reasons, particularly the latter, indicate that
there can be no perfectly acceptable solution which will satisfy all
interests concerned.23 Hence the issue becomes one of balancing the
interests of society and the proponents of a will against those of unnotified, interested parties, with the former clearly outweighing the
latter. For this reason, the proceeding should be considered in rem,
and should bar subsequent actions. This is not to say, however, that
practical steps cannot be taken which will greatly benefit interested
parties by increasing their chances of receiving notice. Legislation
could be enacted which would employ a method by which a list of
interested parties is acquired 2 4 and submitted to the proponents and
which would require the proponents to show that they have sent notice of the forthcoming contest to the parties on the list as a condition
precedent to the contest.2 This will at least insure that notice has
been sent, but it will not allow a subsequent action, even if notice is
not actually received.
22. Poi, roy, EQUrrY JUwISPRUDENCE § 1393 (5th ed. 1941).
23. A statute of limitations could provide the element of finality similar to the
in rem judgment. But no matter how short the limitation period, it would delay
administration and permit the possibility of a multiplicity of suits.
24. This could be attained by requiring the executor to submit an affidavit of heirship. Illinois statutes require the petition to probate to include the names and
addresses of all heirs, devisees, and legatees. ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 3, § 64 (1961).
25. Some states now provide for notice to be sent by mail to the interested parties
prior to probate. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, § 64b (1964). Other states provide for
personal service as an alternative to publication. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(32)
(1962). TURaENTINE, WnLLs AND ADMIN[STA'rioN 81 (2d ed. 1962). Michigan also
requires proof of service before probate. Micr. STAT. ANN.27.3178(35) (1962).
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Equity-Compulsory Medical Aid to Adult Who
Objects on Religious Grounds
Mrs. Jones, mother of a seven-month-old child, was brought to
applicant's hospital after having lost two-thirds of her blood due to a
ruptured ulcer. In spite of the apparent imminence of death unless
blood transfusions were administered, neither Mrs. Jones nor her
husband would consent to such transfusions because of their religious
beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses.' Counsel for Georgetown University
Hospital made application in federal district court for an emergency
writ authorizing the transfusions. 2 The application was denied. Counsel for the hospital immediately appealed to Circuit Judge J. Skelly
Wright. Judge Wright rushed to the hospital, hurriedly conferred
with the patient and other parties concerned, and less than two hours
after the district court's denial, signed the order. Judge Wright's
order was based on the theory that a writ signed by a single circuit
court judge authorizing blood transfusions for the adult mother of an
infant, after she voluntarily has sought treatment in a hospital, is
proper when the transfusions are necessary to preserve the status quo
by saving the patient's life, even though the patient objects upon
religious grounds. 3 President& Directorsof Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition
for rehearing denied en banc,
4
331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Most cases dealing with court orders compelling medical aid have
proceeded under specific legislation, typically, statutes by which the
court may appoint a temporary guardian for children whose parents
refuse them medical aid for any reason.5 No statute was invoked by
applicants in the Georgetown case, and the procedural aspects of
this case are somewhat unusual. Judge Wright based his power to
issue the order on rule 62(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and on the All Writs Act. 6 Judge Miller, criticising the procedure used,
1. Jehovah's Witnesses base their refusal to submit to blood transfusions on several
scriptural passages, including Lev. 17:10, "I [the Lord] shall certainly set my face
against the soul that is eating the blood, and I shall indeed cut him off from among
his people." Blood transfusions are equated with "eating the blood."
2. The application was in the nature of a petition in equity under FED. R. Civ. P. 3,
8(f).
3. This holding was made by Judge Wright alone, in support of his own action
in granting the temporary writ. Thus, it ought not to be considered a holding of the
D.C. Circuit Court.
4. The petition for rehearing apparently was denied because the questions involved
had become moot. There was a concurring opinion by Washington, J., and dissenting
opinions by Miller, J., and Burger, J.
5. See note 19, infra. For representative statute, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-1903
(Supp.1964).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1959).

1965 ]

RECENT CASES

argued, first, that no action was filed properly in district court and
thus no proper appeal was possible; and second, in view of 28 U.S.C.
section 46(b), 7 "had there been an actual appeal, a single appellate
judge was not authorized to act."8 Judge Miller discounted the use
of an appellate judge's injunctive power under rule 62(g) to preserve
the status quo, on the ground that the order itself completely changed
the status quoY It is significant to note the extent of Judge Wright's
dilemma; had he not signed the order, the issue almost certainly
would have become moot because of the patient's death. On the other
hand, granting the temporary order provided full and final relief for
applicant, thereby making the issue equally moot. Despite Judge
Miller's strong dissent on procedural grounds, it is submitted that the
more important questions raised by this case concern the substantive
rights of the person against whom such an order is issued. Nearly a
quarter of a century ago Mr. Justice Roberts put forward the familiar
rule that the freedom to act upon religious grounds is subject to state
regulation only when the acts present a "clear and present danger to
a substantial interest of the state." 10 Courts often have been called
upon to sustain regulations of religious practices which have been
deemed threats to the state's interests," ranging from the practice of
polygamy in Utah 2 to that of snake handling in the Tennessee hills. 13
Nevertheless,
courts have been particularly careful to protect the
"preferred" 14 freedom of religion from undue regulation, as eidenced
by several recent cases. 15 Among the cases dealing specifically with
enforced medical treatment, many have sustained public health
17
statutes calling for compulsory chest x-rays 6 and water fluoridation,
7. This subsection requires that three judges determine cases and controversies
before a circuit court.
8. 331 F.2d at 1013 (dissenting opinion).
9. Id. at 1014.
10. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
11. See Antieau, The Limitation of Religious Liberty, 18 FoRDrHAM L. REv. 221

(1949).
12. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
13. Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
14. "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred
position." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See also Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); United States v. Ballad, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
15. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), in which appellants disqualification from unemployment compensation benefits because of her refusal to
work on Saturday due to her religious convictions was held an unconstitutional
abridgement of her religious freedom; People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d
813 (1964), in which the California Supreme Court held that conviction under a
state statute proscribing the use of peyote was unconstitutional as applied to Navajo
Indians who used peyote in their religious ritual; In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn.
1963), in which conviction for contempt because of appellants refusal on religious
grounds to serve as juror was reversed as an abridgement of first amendment rights.
16. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
17. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955), appeal
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in spite of religious objections, as well as compulsory innoculations 8
when other constitutional objections were raised. These and numerous
other public health statutes have been upheld as a proper exercise
of the state's police power. Closer to the facts of the instant case is

a group of cases dealing with medical aid compelled by court order.
Many of these cases involve children whose parents, on religious
grounds, refused to consent to their being medically treated." Courts
compelling medical aid for children base their action on the doctrine
of parens patriae, by which courts may assume guardianship over
children whose parents are deemed inadequate or negligent in caring
for them. 20 The application of this doctrine is generally restricted

to situations in which the harm threatened without medical aid is

great, and the danger involved in the treatment is relatively slight.21
The exact limits of the application of parens patriae are, however, by
no means certain. 22 The New Jersey Supreme Court recently extended
the doctrine to compel a thirty-two-weeks pregnant Jehovah's Witness

to submit to blood transfusions in order to protect her unborn child.23
Clearly, the Georgetown case involves neither an exercise of the
state's ordinary police power to protect public health nor an exercise

of parens patriae as the doctrine has been previously applied. Judge
Wright based his authority to order the patient's transfusions on
several special facts in this case. First, immediate transfusions were
necessary to maintain the status quo2 4 by preserving the patient's
dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1955), 13 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 38 (1956). But cf. Nichols,
Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 So. CAL. L. RE;V. 158 (1959).
18. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), in which none of appellant's
objections to a state statute requiring smallpox vaccinations was based on religious
grounds. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court later cited Jacobson for the proposition
that one "cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination . . .on religious grounds."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
19. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751
(1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See generally
Notes, Medical Aid for Children Without Parental Consent, 13 Wyo. L.J. 88 (1958).
20. "A child becomes the ward of the state and is to have protection of its life,
limb and its person and property where that is withheld by its parents because of
neglect or poverty, or denied because of ignorance." In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948,
949, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (1941).
On the parens patriae doctrine, Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote, "Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944). The Georgetown case, it might be added, puts this tentative recognition
of the parents' freedom to martyr themselves in doubt.
21. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. App. 1952).
22. Compare In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955), and In re Hudson,
13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), with Morrison v. State, supra note 21; In ro
Rotkowitz, supra note 20.
23. Raleigh Fitldn-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (1964).
24. See FED. R. Crv. P. 62(g).
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life. Second, this was not a case of a court's thwarting a religiously

inspired suicide, since the, patient wanted to live. Third, he theorized
that the parens patriae doctrine might be extended to this adult
patient on the ground that the welfare of her seven-month-old child
was sufficiently dependent upon her survival to warrant enforcement
of the transfusions; also, that she was in extremis, and thereby "as
little able competently to decide for herself as any child would be."25
Fourth, without the order, the hospital,' to which the patient voluntarily had come for treatment, might have risked civil and criminal
liability for failing to give her proper care. Finally, Judge Wright
stressed that his order would not violate the patient's religious convictions, because the treatment was not taken by her own volition.2 6
The Georgetown case points up the lamentable lack of certainty
concerning the limits to which courts may go in compelling medical
aid objected to on religious grounds. Acts by the judiciary are often
as much a part of state action as acts by the legislature.2 7 It would
seem to follow that the clear and present danger test applied to
legislation in Cantwe1 28 should be applied to judicial action with
equal force, particularly in view of the preferred position rightfully
accorded religious freedom today.29 Undoubtedly there are situations
in which court orders compelling medical aid can be justified, as
when the patient is an infant, 30 or is otherwise unable to make the
decision for himself. 31 It is submitted, however, that the kind of
situation presented in the Georgetown case is one which calls for
judicial restraint rather than judicial action. Otherwise, ours will be
a nation which requires its citizens to risk their lives in defense of
their country, but forbids them to risk their lives for their religious
convictions. Until guidelines are formulated defining the extent to
which the first amendment freedom of religion inhibits a court's power
to compel medical aid for both children and adults, judges confronted
with dilemmas such as the one Judge Wright faced in the principal
case will undoubtedly continue to err on the side of preserving lives
rather than on the side of protecting less tangible, though no less
perishable, constitutional rights.
25. 331 F.2d at 1008.
26. Although the order may not have affected the patient's right to believe, the
important consideration is that it did interfere with her right to act on religious grounds.
27. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948), Twining v. N. J., 211 U.S. 78, 90-91
(1908). These cases dealt, of course, with action by state courts; however, it must
follow that action by a federal court is also state action in the larger sense of the word
"state," that is, action by the federal government, and that such action is a fortiori
limited by the first amendment.
28. Supra, note 10.
29. See, e.g., notes 14, 15 supra.
30. See notes 19, 20 supra, and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Collins v. Davis, 33 L.W. 2313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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Federal Courts-Vexatious Suit-Attorney's Fees as
Element of Costs-Denial of Plaintiff's Motion
to Dismiss With Prejudice
In March of 1964, plaintiff, Dan Smoot, a political analyst who
produces television and radio programs, with published reprints
to further broadcast his views, commenced suit for libel in the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Michigan based upon
diversity of citizenship against The League of Women Voters, Grand
Traverse Area of Michigan and four of its members. He alleged that
a bulletin of the League had defamed him by, inter alia, characterizing
the Smoot Report as "slanted information, half-truths, innuendos and
sometimes worse."1 Defendant, claiming that the suit was brought2
and maintained in bad faith, vexatiously and for an oppressive reason,
moved to require the plaintiff to post costs, including attorney's fees.
Held, motion granted and cost bond set at 15,000 dollars. A federal
court may require of a non-resident plaintiff security for costs and
include attorney's fees as an element of such costs. 3 While the court
1. The basis of the action is the December, 1963 bulletin of the League, a portion
of which, as contained in plaintiff's complaint, is as follows: "The Dan Smoot T. V.
program . . . is a skillful, professional job of propaganda against-against the United
Nations, against the income tax, against civil rights for the Negro. It is based on
slanted information, half-truths, innuendos, and sometimes worse.
Few of us have ever been so shocked by any event, public or personal, as by the
wanton murder of our President. That it could happen in the United States of
Americal . . . And how did it happen that our Ambassador to the United Nations
was spat upon? How could four little girls be dynamited to death in their Sunday
School? How could a small Negro boy be gunned down from his bicycle by an Eagle
Boy Scout who didn't even know him? . . . Can the right of free speech justify the
kind of propaganda that stirs people to fear and hate so unreasoningly?
I urge you all to watch for the Dan Smoot program, and to view it critically ...
This man is a clever Pied Piper. But after a few programs he cannot but reveal himself
to informed and critical listeners." Plaintiff's Complaint PP. 2, 3, Smoot v. League of
Women Voters, Civil Nos. 4708-4709, W.D. Mich., Oct. 1964.
2. Defendant in its Answer of April 20 admitted publishing the article but denied
the interpretation given to it by the plaintiff. Defendant's Answer p. 2, Smoot v. League
of Women Voters, supra note 1. The affirmative defenses of truth and privilege were
relied upon. Defendant's Answer, supra p. 4.
Defendant had earlier published a retraction of its remark and apologized to
plaintiff. Defendant's Answer, supra p. 3.
Defendant attempted to support its charge as to the vexatious nature of the suit by a
direct quotation from the John Birch Society Blue Book which appears to advocate the
use of the libel suit for extra-legal purposes. Defendant's Brief in support of defendant's
motion for security for costs, pp. 14, 15, Smoot v. League of Women Voters, supra
note 1. An inherently vexatious quality of the libel suit is that the potential civil liability
inhibits the accused from making further comment until the liability is determined in
court. The plaintiff can restrain the defendant from further comment and yet evade
a general principle that equity will not enjoin the commission of a libel.
3. Smoot v. League of Women Voters, Civil Nos. 4708-4709, W.D. Mich., Oct. 1964
(opinion on motion for jury trial and motion for security for costs).
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was considering the above motion, plaintiff moved, under Rule
41(a) (2),4 to dismiss his action with prejudice. 5 Held, motion denied.
A motion under Rule 41(a) (2) is addressed to the discretion of the
court and the prevention of prejudice to defendants and protection
of public interest in settling constitutional questions of freedom
of expression demand that the case proceed to trial.6 Smoot v. League
of Women Voters, Civil Nos. 4708-4709, W.D. Mich., October 1964.
Courts still find themselves beset by the nagging problem of the
suit brought only for its nuisance value.7 Strike suits,8 harassment
with multiple actions, 9 baseless petitions for injunctions against business competitors, 0 small claims brought in courts of superior juris4. "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion
to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice." FED. R. Cirv. P. 41(a) (2).
Rule 41(a) (1) referred to in Rule 41(a) (2) provides that action may be dismissed
by plaintiff without order of court by filing notice of dismissal before service by
adverse party of answer or of a motion for summary judgment, or by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Since
defendant had served its answer before plaintiff made his- motion to dismiss, Rule
41(a) (2) is applicable.
5. The grounds of plaintiff's motion to dismiss were: (1) the inference in the
defendant's article that plaintiff was somehow partly responsible for the murder of
President Kennedy had been completely refuted by report of the Warren Commission
and thus plaintiff had been vindicated of any responsibility or relation to the alleged
assassin; (2) plaintiff's counsel had withdrawn because of illness; (3) that the
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), may have extended to
defendants a privilege and right of fair comment as to plaintiff.
A treatment of the constitutional questions of freedom of speech is not within the
scope of this comment. See 9 VILL. L. REv. 534 (1964); 50 IowA L. REv. 170 (1964),
for comments on New York Times v. Sullivan, supra.
6. Smoot v. League of Women Voters, Civil Nos. 4708-4709, W.D. Mich., Oct.
1964 (opinion on motion to dismiss).
The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of prohibition and mandamus demanding that
Judge Fox of the federal district court be compelled to allow plaintiff to dismiss his
action. The petition was granted on the ground that a trial judge has no power to
require a lawyer to submit evidence on behalf of a plaintiff when he considers he has
no cause of action or for any reason wishes to dismiss his action with prejudice. Smoot
v. Fox, Civil No. 16207, 6th Cir., Dec. 30, 1964.
Both parties have petitioned for a rehearing and clarification so as to determine
whether attorney's fees are to be included as an element of costs.
7. See 50 ILL. B.J. 800 (1962).
8. A strike suit has been defined as "an action brought by a security holder, not in
good faith, but through the exploitation of its nuisance value, to force the payment
of a sum disproportionate to the normal value of his interest as the price of discontinuance." Note, 34 COLum. L. REv. 1308 (1934).
9. See, e.g., Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
10. See, e.g., Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C. 386, 104 S.E. 764 (1920).
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diction," and various procedural devices' 2 are but some of the tactics
devised by parties plaintiff for purposes of vexation. The only sanction
generally available against a vexatious litigant willing to pay his own
costs is the threat of taxation with the costs of his adversary. 13 Some

legislatures have sought to curb strike suits and even libel suits by
enacting statutes requiring security for costs, including attorney's

fees, upon motion by the defendant. 14 The statutes have been
criticized as a bar to actions by a party who has suffered actual injury
and who wishes to bring suit to prevent further abuse of his interest.' 5
The efficacy of the American law of taxing costs, moreover, has been
seriously questioned by many as a means of preventing this "nuisance

suit."16
Although security for costs is not, in most instances, provided for
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 such security has been
required in some cases since, by virtue of Rule 83,1 the district courts
may make their own rules not inconsistent with the Rules or federal
statutes.' 9 The requirement of security for costs is usually regarded as
procedural for purposes of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 20 and thus within
11. The vexatious nature of these suits arises from the fact that courts of superior
jurisdiction have more congested calendars than the lower courts and the court costs
are higher. Note, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 78, 83-84 (1953).
12. Some of the more common devices have been listed as sham pleadings, frivolous
demurrers, refusal to answer interrogatories, constant requests for continuances and
dilatory appeals. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 79. It is sometimes possible for a defendant who has prevailed over a
vexatious plaintiff to exact a measure of compensation through a separate action for
abuse of process or malicious prosecution. The courts, however, do not favor these
actions. See PRossu, ToRTs 852-78 (3d ed. 1964).
14. See, e.g., CAL. CoRnP. CODE § 834 (1959) and N.Y. Civ. Pnoc. LAW § 8501
(shareholder's derivative suit); CAL. CIV. PROC. § 830 (security for costs in libel action).
15. See, e.g., Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholder's Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944).

16. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE Q. 849, 877-78 (1929); Greensberger, The Cost
of Justice: An American Problem, an English Solution, 9 ViLL. L. REV. 400 (1964);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of LitigationP, 49 Iowa L. REv. 75, 78
(1964); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931).
17. 6 Mooa, FEDEPAL PRAc'ncE 1327 (1951). Rule 65(c) provides for security as
a prerequisite for the issuance of a restraining order or preliminary injunction. Rule
73 provides for security for costs on an appeal to the court of appeals.
18. "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules..
.. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." FED.R.Cir. P. 83.
See National Distillers Products Corp. v. Hindech, 10 F.R.D. 229 (D. Colo. 1950);
Leaki v. New York Cent. R.R., 26 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.N.Y. 1939).
iRussel v. Cunningham, 233 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1956).
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Moore; op cit. supra note 17, at 1331-32. Moore, in
discussing whether the problem of security,for costs is procedural or substantive within
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, notes that the problem may arise in broadly three distinct
factual situations. The traditional problem -arises when the state requires security for
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the rule making power of the individual court. However, a federal
court may refer to and adopt state practice in making its court rules. 2'
In an ordinary diversity case a state law denying the right to attorney's
fees or giving a right thereto which reflects a substantial policy of the
state should be followed unless it runs counter to a valid federal

statute or rule of court.2 Many courts, both state and federal, have
required security for costs when plaintiff is a non-resident of the

forum,2 but such costs generally do not include attorney's fees.2

In actions of an equitable nature, costs, including attorney's fees, are

often allowed to a plaintiff who has successfully protected a fund.25
Treating attorney's fees as an element of costs would appear to

eliminate any distinction between plaintiff and defendant by reimbursing the successful party regardless of his position in the action.
Professor Moore argues that a federal court may have the power,
bounded only by its discretion under Rule 54(d), 26 to award attorney's fees in all civil actions.- The basis of the argument is that Rule
54(d) appears to make no distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity and that equitable growth warrants this exercise of power.28
costs but those costs only involve a small liability. Moore states that in this situation
the federal court in a diversity action is not bound to follow the state policy. At the
other extreme is a situation as in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), where state statute required, in a stockholder's derivative action, that plaintiff stockholder must give security for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
which may be incurred by defendants. Since this is a new liability created by the
state and the liability extends beyond payment of traditional costs, the Supreme
Court held that within Erie-Tompkins the federal court had to follow the state's
policy. A situation lying between Cohen and the traditional problem is that of Keller
Research Corp. v. Roquerre, 99 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Cal. 1951), where a state law
requires a party to post $500 in a libel or slander action, including $100 for counsel
fees. Here the federal court followed the state requirement since the state had expressed
a substantial policy toward limiting defamation actions and a new liability for attorney's
fees had been imposed upon the unsuccessful claimant.
Moore concludes that the variation in degree of the state's requirement may be
determinative of whether it expresses a substantial policy of the state to impose a new
liability. The state's creation of liability of a plaintiff for the defendant's attorney's
fees would appear to be substantive for purpose of Erie.
21. BARuoN & HoLrTzoFF, FEDERAL PRnA CE & PROCEDURE § 1198 (1958).
22. MooRE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1354.
23. McPhail, Security for Costs and Its Treatment in United States Treaties, 37
TUL.L. REv. 461, 462 (1963).
24. BArRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 21, § 1197.
25. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-67 (1939); Trustees
v. Greenbough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) (action by bondholder); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Lloyd, 194 F. Supp. 816 (N.D.N.Y. 1961); 2 S EEr, FEDaERAL EQurry
PRcrncE § 2033-34 (1909).
26. 'Except when expression therefor is made either in a statute of United States
or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
27. MooRE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1354, especially n.18. "Certainly insofar as
Rule 54(d) has any bearing on the subject it makes no distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity."
28. Ibid.
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Arguments for inclusion of attorney's fees as costs are that the
allowance of them would attempt only to make the successful party
whole,29 and that it would discourage the institution of unfounded
litigation and at the same time encourage the meritorious suit. 30 The

reply is usually that every man has a right to go to court and should
not be deterred by the fear of being saddled with his opponent's
legal expenses. 31

Contrary to common law,32 a plaintiff under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may obtain a voluntary dismissal of his action only

by order of the court after service of an answer or motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party.3 The courts are agreed that under
Rule 41(a) (2) there is no absolute right to dismiss.M In exercising its
discretion the Supreme Court follows the principle that "unless the

defendant would suffer some plain legal prejudice other than mere
prospect of a second law suit" a motion to dismiss without prejudice
will be granted.3 Thus the motion to dismiss without prejudice has
been denied a plaintiff who wished to bring a suit in a foreign juris-

diction that would place an onerous burden on defendants who had
already incurred substantial expenses. 36 It has also been denied on

the ground that there was a public interest in having the controversy
settled.37 The motion to dismiss without prejudice has been granted

where the only prejudice to defendant would be attorney's fees already
expended.8 Contrary to a dismissal without prejudice, a dismissal

with prejudice is a final judgment on the merits, barring subsequent

action. 39 In no reported case has a federal court denied a plaintiff's
motion for dismissal with prejudice, although a motion for voluntary
29. Greensberger, supranote 16, at 401.
30. Goodrich, supra note 16, at 862.
31. Kuenzel, supra note 16, at 81. See note 15 supra.
32. At common law a plaintiff had an absolute right to dismiss his suit without
prejudice at any time before verdict or judgment. See Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp.,
265 U.S. 86 (1924) (judgement); Barret v. Virginian Ry., 250 U.S. 473 (1919)
(judgement).
33. See FED. R. Cr. P. 41(a) (1), and 41(a) (2), note 4 supra.
34. Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1950), represented the
lone example of the belief that the right to dismiss was absolute. It was overruled in
Grivas v. Parmelee Transportation Co., 207 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 913 (1953). See Moore v. C. R. Anthony Co., 198 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
1952); Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1951).
35. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp &Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947) (dictum).
36. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). Plaintiff intended to commence a new action in British Guiana and defendant
had already incurred expenses of $84,000.
37. Churchward Int'l Steel Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 286 Fed. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1912).
38. Pathe Laboratories, Inc. v. Technicolor Motion Picture Corp., 19 F.R.D. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). The motion to dismiss was granted upon condition that plaintiff
pay defendant for reasonable attorney's fees incurred.
39. Cleveland v. Higgins, 148 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.

722 (1945).
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dismissal by stipulation of the parties under Rule 41(a) (2) has been
denied in order to protect an attorney's lien on the proceeds of the
40
case.
The court's opinions in the instant cases41 are colored by its
suspicion that the suit was instituted for a vexatious purpose. The
court, without indicating whether it was making a rule of court under
Rule 83, granted the motion for security costs, reasoning that if
proof at trial should show that plaintiff brought suit only to harass
defendant and restrain him from maldng further comments, the
defendant should not incur the additional burden of collecting the
costs in a foreign jurisdiction. If defendant cannot substantiate its
claim, the court reasons that plaintiff will have lost only the cost
of the bond or the interest on the cash amount of the bond, either
of which would be offset by a recovery of any magnitude at trial.
The court cites no authority for the inclusion of attorney's fees as an

element of costs. 42 In denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss with

prejudice under Rule 41(a) (2), the court concluded that both the

defendant and the public would be prejudiced by a dismissal of the
action. The League had had its name tainted by the plaintiff's

accusations and had, after plaintiff refused to make a settlement,
made extensive preparations for trial,43 and the public was interested

in and vitally concerned with an answer to the questions of constitu-

tional law raised by the pleadings. 44
The instant case raises two important questions. The first, which
actually consists of two parts, is whether a federal district court has the
40. "As a matter of fact, Rule 41 was intended for the purpose of setting forth and
curbing the right of a plaintiff to discontinue actions .. " Ingold v. Ingold, 30 F.
Supp. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See BA~noN & HoLToFF, op. cit. supra note 21,
§ 911, at 109-10, for presentation of problem whether if the plaintiff had filed the dismissal by stipulation instead of the defendant, the plaintiff could have obtained a writ
of mandamus to compel the clerk to file the dismissal.
41. There were two opinions. See notes 3 and 6 supra.
42. The court's opinion on security for costs makes no specific mention of the
attorney's fees being allowed as an element of costs, but since defendant's motion was
for costs including attorney's fees and since the amount, $15,000, is more substantial
than the amount generally set for costs without attorney's fees as an element, it is
evident the court included attorney's fees as an element of costs. The opinion was
obviously not prepared for publication.
43. The court notes that defendant had arranged to have many prominent people
from various parts of the country testify at the trial. The court seems to regard the
willingness of these national figures to testify as being an indication of the public
concern in the issues raised in the suit.
44. See note 5 supra for reference to New York Times v. Sullivan in the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. There appear to be two aspects to the question: whether the
principle of New York Times v. Sullivan can be extended to a private citizen who is a
journalist, radio-T.V. commentator and the like, and, whether a libel suit brought
against a publisher only for a vexatious purpose infringes upon the publisher's constitutional right of freedom of expression when the potentially large monetary liability
has forced the publisher to refrain from further comment pending a trial of the suit.
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discretionary power to require from a non-resident plaintiff security
for costs, including the defendant's attorney's fees, and to deny a
voluntary dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff. That a federal district
court has the discretionary power to deny a motion for a voluntary
nonsuit without prejudice in a fact situation similar to the one
presented here seems apparent. 45 No federal court, however, has
denied a plaintiff's motion to dismiss with prejudice. That it has the
power to require a litigant to post a bond for costs is the general
rule.46 Although it is not a factor in the instant case, a federal court's
discretion as to the inclusion of attorney's fees as an element of costs
would, doubtless, be limited in some situations by state law.47
Assuming this court had the power to do all that it did in this case,
the second question is whether it should exercise such power when
the effect of its action may be to deter litigants from coming into
court. That the courts are open for the redress of injury is a basic
premise of the American legal system. The principle of free access to
a court, however, does not include a policy which favors vexatious
suits known to be groundless.4 It is suggested that if a court requires
a procedure which is reasonable and fair to the plaintiff before ruling
on a motion for security for costs, including attorney's fees, the
honest litigant will not be deterred from coming to court.49 In the
instant case, a hearing was held on the motion before it was granted,
and the defendant will be required to prove at trial that the suit was
vexatious and groundless before he can recover the costs. Such procedure seems reasonable and fair. The inclusion of attorney's fees as
an element of costs would make the court's action more effective
in restraining the use of the "nuisance suit."50 A federal court has
the power to award attorney's fees as an element of costs even in a
suit at law,5 ' though prior to this case no court has exercised it. The
inclusion of attorney's fees in costs might well be extended from the
narrowly restricted class of cases in which it is now allowed and
applied to all cases where the suit is brought only for its nuisance
value.52 When a court, however, after concluding that the plaintiff
is liable for these substantial costs, refuses to permit him voluntarily
45. See notes 36 & 37 supra.
46. See note 17 supra.
47. See notes 20 & 28 supra.
48. "The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work
oppression or wrong." Canon 30, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHIcs
6 (1962).
49. See LATriN, CoRPoRAToNs 385-88 (1959).
50. See Kuenzel, supra note 16.
51. See note 26 supra.
52. See Note, supra note 11, for good discussion of the general problem.
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to withdraw his action on the same basis as if there had been an
adjudication on the merits, the lawsuit ceases to be between adversaries and becomes merely a proceeding to punish the litigant for
instituting the action. Does the public's interest in the controversy
demand that the adversary system be distorted
by requiring that an
53
involuntary plaintiff prosecute the action?

Labor Law-Pre-emption-Applicability

of Pre-emption

Doctrine to Libel Action Arguably Subject

to Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA
Defendant union began a campaign to organize the employees
of the Ox-Wall Products Manufacturing Co., a corporation engaged
in interstate commerce, but its efforts were actively resisted by the
employer acting through its plant manager, the plaintiff. During the
course of the campaign the union representative allegedly made certain libellous statements concerning the plaintiff through the medium
of a pamphlet published periodically by the union. The bitter
conflicts arising from this campaign resulted in the issuance of an
unfair labor practice complaint by the Regional Director of the
National Labor Relations Board, and in the filing of this common
law libel action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.
The Board found that the employer had committed certain unfair
labor practices in that it had interfered with employees exercising
their section 71 rights2 and had discriminated with regard to tenure
of employment to discourage membership in a labor organization. 3
Accordingly, the Board issued a cease and desist order.4 In the
53. See note 6 supra for the conclusion of the appellate court on this problem.
1. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958),
which provides in relevant part that "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, ... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection ......
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1958), which provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7."
3. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1963),
which provides in relevant part that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... "
4. In addition, the Board ordered the reinstatement with back pay of certain employees
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superior court, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the statements alleged to be libellous were "part and
parcel" 5 of the aforementioned labor dispute, thereby bringing the
entire action within the exclusive purview of the NLRA and thus
pre-empting it from state jurisdiction. This motion was denied by
the trial court. On appeal to the superior court, appellate division,
summary judgment was entered against the plaintiff on the ground
that the jurisdiction of the state court had been pre-empted by the
NLRA. On plaintiff's appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
held, affirmed. State courts are pre-empted from entertaining libel
actions arising from activities arguably subject to the protections of
section 7 or the provisions of section 8 of the NLRA. 6 Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964).
It is apparent that Congress, by the adoption of the NLRA, as
amended, intended to enact a comprehensive, nationwide scheme for
the regulation of labor relations in industries affecting interstate
commerce. Congress, realizing the necessity for expertise as well
as for a system of uniform procedures and remedies in the field of
labor law, entrusted the primary responsibility of regulating labor
relations within the ambit of the act to the National Labor Relations
Board,7 and it further "intended to and did vest in the Board
the fullest jurisdictional breadth permissible under the Commerce
Clause."8 Thus, if state law, with its inevitably varying procedures
and remedies, were allowed to encroach upon the federal domain,
it is obvious that the intent of Congress would be defeated. Of
course, it is elementary constitutional law that if there is a direct
conflict between the NLRA and the various state laws, the state law
or laws must yield under the "supremacy clause"9 of the Constitution.10 A more difficult question is presented when the conflict is not
prima facie direct, but where such conflict may arise from an independent administration of the respective laws." It was to cope with
this problem area where state law and the NLRA cannot "move
freely within the orbit of their respective purposes without infringing
who had been discriminatorily discharged in the labor dispute. This affirmative relief,
however, is not relevant to the instant discussion.
5. Defendant's Application for Leave to Appeal, Appendix, p. 16a, Blum v. Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, 80 N.J. Super. 37, 192 A.2d 842 (1963).
6. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (Supp. V, 1963).
7. National Labor Relations Act § 3, 49 Stat. 451 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1958).
8. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Co., 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
10. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
11. CCH, 1964 GUIDEBOOK TO LABOR RELATONS § 202 (5th ed.).
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upon one another" 12 that the doctrine of pre-emption was first superby the Supreme Court of the United States,
imposed upon the act
13
albeit not expressly.
In subsequent cases the Court expressly delineated the concept of
pre-emption, striking down state labor statutes purporting to regulate conduct already regulated by the NLRA 14 and emphasizing that
conflict is imminent when separate remedies are brought to bear on
the same problem. 15 The Court then declared that state common
law rules 16 as well as regulatory statutes pertaining to areas other

than labor relations 1'7 would be pre-empted if they tended to regulate

activities either protected or prohibited by the NLRA. In so doing

the Court laid to rest the contention that a distinction should be
made between statutes and rules of decision having mere general

application and laws which deal with labor relations as such.', A
further expansion of the doctrine was made in Guss v. Utah Labor
Board,19 where the Court held that under section 10(a)20 of the act,
Congress has completely displaced state power to deal in areas of

potential conflict although the NLRB may have declined or would
obviously decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Thus, the vigorously

condemned "no-man's land" was established into which state law

could not and federal law would not enter. 2' Subsequently, the Court
handed down its most significant statement of the pre-emption doctrine in the second San Diego Building & Trades Council v. Garnon2 2
12. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 543 (1945).
13. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945).
14. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); accord, Arnalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
15. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, supra note 14. But see Carey v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 376 U.S. 261 (1964).
16. Building Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1953).
17. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
18. San Diego Bldg. & Trades Council v. Canmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1059), 13 VmD.
L. RFv. 416 (1960); Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CH. L. REv.
543, 555 (1959). But see Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv.
L. REV. 1297, 1322 (1954).
19. 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Of course, the Board could specifically agree to cede its
jurisdiction to the state pursuant to section 10 of the act.
20. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
21. It would appear that the court had recognized the existence of a "no-man's
land" some eight years before in LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
22. Supra note 18. The reader's attention is directed to the interrelationship of two
separate concepts at this point: (1) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction which necessitates that the controversy be adjudicated by the proper administrative agency first,
and (2) pre-emption which requires that federal law must govern to the exclusion of
state law.
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decision where it held that when an activity over which the state
seeks to exercise its jurisdiction is arguably subject to the provisions
of either section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA, the states as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
NLRB.23 In the same year, the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 amended the NLRA to permit the states to
assert jurisdiction in cases declined by the NLRB, 24 thereby eliminating the "no-man's land," and lessening the impact of the Garmon II
decision.25 The current state of the law in regard to the pre-emption
doctrine may be stated thus: The jurisdiction of the NLRB over
activities arguably protected or prohibited under the NLRA, as
amended, is exclusive, except for those cases declined by the Board
for failure to meet its jurisdictional yardsticks. 26 The exclusiveness
of the Board's jurisdiction over all cases meeting its jurisdictional
yardsticks may be further emphasized by the fact that the states
remain powerless to act even after the NLRB refuses to exercise
its unquestioned jurisdiction over a particular case on the ground
that the controversy involved lacks merit.27 At this point, mention
should be made of the fact that the Board may protect its jurisdiction
by petitioning a federal district court for an injunction against the
20
proceedings pending in either the state agency2 or the state court.
While the general rule, as summarized above, is well settled, it is
likewise true that the act, as construed by the Court, has left much
authority to the states 30 in the form of what must be considered
exceptions to this general rule. First, a state, under its general police
power, may exercise jurisdiction over labor activities involving violence,3 ' or a threat of violence,3 2 although these same activities may
constitute unfair labor practices. Second, the states are free to regulate the internal affairs of unions, although the pre-emption doc23. Accord, DeVries v. Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co., 359 U.S. 498 (1959); Local
848, Grocery Drivers Union v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 359 U.S. 434 (1959); see 3 CCH
5500.0611-.062, and the cases collected therein.
LAB. L. REP. f111
24. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 701(a) (Supp. V, 1963).
25. 13 VAND. L. REv. 416, 420 (1960).
26. 3 CCII LAB. L. REP. I[ 5500.07.
27. Id. II'J 5500.19, 5500.194-.198 and see the cases collected therein.
28. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
29. Ibid. Note, however, that Congress has provided that "A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
30. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, supra note 14.
31. International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
32. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
Accord, Youngsdahl v. Rainfair, 356 U.S. 131 (1957).
33. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), 12" VAND.
L. REv. 287 (1958).
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trine will apply if the activity complained of exceeds the bounds of
purely intra-union affairs and involves the employment relation in
any fashion whatever.3 Third, the Garmon II decision in no way
affects the states' concurrent jurisdiction over damage suits arising
from the breach of a collective bargaining agreement under section
36 and the state courts have continued
to enjoin
3 0 1 35 of the act,
picketing conducted in defiance of a collective bargaining agreement.3 7
However, a state court may neither enjoin secondary boycotts,38 nor
entertain a suit for damages resulting from secondary boycott activity
under section 303 39 of the act.40 Fourth, the determination of whether
a union or agency shop agreement violates a state right to work law
may be made by a state court,41 although the question whether the
state has jurisdiction to afford a remedy for such violations remains
undecided. 42 Fifth, the state may exercise its jurisdiction in regard to
intermittent work stoppages, 43 although subsequent dicta by the
Court have rendered this questionable.4 Sixth, and last, Congress
may specifically assent to a state scheme of labor regulation irrespective of the potential conflict, though such cases are understandably
45
rare.
The court in the instant case, in reaching its decision that a state
court may not entertain a common law libel action arising out of
a labor dispute where the alleged libellous statements are arguably
subject to the provisions of the NLRA, based its holding almost
exclusively on the line of Supreme Court decisions enumerated
above, and relied most heavily on Garmon 11. The majority reasoned
that the NLRB could well be called upon to determine whether the
alleged defamatory statements constituted an unfair labor practice,
or on the other hand, whether the statements were permissible under
34. Local 27, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963); Local 100,
Int'l Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
35. Labor Management Relations Act § 301> 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1958).
36. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368

U.S. 503 (1962).

37. McLean Distrib. Co. v. Local 993, Brewery Drivers, 254 Minn. 204, 94 N.W.2d
514 (1959); Benton, Inc. v. Local 333, Painters Union, 45 Cal. 2d 677, 291 P.2d

13 (1955).
38. Pocatello Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. E.H. Elle Constr. Co., 352 U.S. 884

(1956).

39. Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
187(b) (1958).
40. See Local 120, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
41. Local 1625, Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).

42. Ibid.

43. Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
44. See San Diego Bldg. & Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 18, at 245 n.4.
45. See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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8(c)46 of the act.47 Further, since the alleged defamation occurred
during the course of an organizational campaign which would, in all
probability, culminate in an election, the Board might have to determine whether the statements "went too far and impaired the employees' freedom of choice" 48 in connection with its certification
proceedings under section 9(c). 49 Accordingly, the majority distinguished California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Local 42, Team-

sters Union,50 where the trial court rejected the union's defense of
pre-emption, on the ground that there was no organizational dispute
involved in that case. The court emphasized the fact that if state
courts were allowed to assert jurisdiction over common law libel
actions of the type involved here, there would be a very real danger
of conflict with the national scheme of regulation in that the Board
might find the statements within permissible standards or even truthful, while a jury might find them to be defamatory. 51 Upon these
considerations, the court found the alleged libel to be, in the language
of Garmon II, within one of the "areas of conduct which must be
free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered."12
The three dissenting judges reasoned that since state courts are
allowed to entertain damage suits based upon violence, state courts
should likewise be free to assert their customary jurisdiction over
libel actions because libel is a notorious inciter of violence. They
also emphasized the undesirability of leaving the wronged plaintiff
without a remedy.
Setting aside any consideration of those areas Congress itself has
not seen fit to occupy to the exclusion of the states, 3 the situations
over which the states have been allowed to assert their jurisdiction
have been those involving a compelling state interest or policy. 4
Thus, the question presented here, which must be answered in the
negative, is whether the regulation of defamation is so vital a state
interest as to permit the inference that Congress has not deprived the
states of their power to act in this area. 55 In other words, the salutary effect of allowing a libel victim to pursue his remedy in the state
courts must be weighed against the interference with the national
46. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(c), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(c) (1958). See the text of this subsection quoted in note 61, infra.
47. Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46, 53 (1964).
48. Ibid.
49. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1958).
50. 45 L.C. 50, 546 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1962).
51. Supra note 47.
52. 359 U.S. at 246.
53. See text accompanying notes 31-45, supra.
54. See e.g., International Union, UAW v. Russell, supra note 31.
55. Ibid.
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scheme of regulation this allowance must inevitably cause. Congress
has clearly articulated its intent to protect the workers' full freedom
of association and self-organization, and it is axiomatic that the free
interchange of ideas and information is essential to a knowledgable
exercise of this freedom. Consequently, Congress sought to provide
57
for such free communication by adding the "free speech provision"
to the NLRA. Moreover, the threat of state sanctions may well tend
"to deprive employees of the fullness of information and debate which
is properly part of the scene," 58 and by so doing infringe upon this
area of association which Congress has determined to be free.
The conclusion is inescapable that allowing a state court to
award damages for libellous statements uttered in the course of a
labor dispute would be merely allowing the vindication of a private
right, a right which must give way to the national purpose of promoting stability in labor relations. 59 Accordingly, it is arguable that
communications such as those in question are subject to the right
of self-organization as granted by section 7.6o In addition to finding
the statements in question subject to section 7, the court also found
them to be arguably subject to the unfair labor practice provisions
as well as the "free speech provision" of section 8. It is this latter
reasoning which is singularly unconvincing. Section 8(c),61 although
it applies to both employers and unions alike,62 is a remedial provision,
as opposed to an unfair labor practice provision, in that it precludes
the finding that a given statement constitutes an unfair labor practice if it complies with the requirements of this subsection. If, in a
hypothetical case, it could be determined that an alleged defamation
was not arguably subject to section 7 and that it did not constitute
an unfair labor practice, the question whether it was protected under
8(c) could not arise. The contrary conclusion, if reached in this
hypothetical case, would require pre-emption in order that the Board
could determine that what could not possibly be an unfair labor
practice may or may not be an unfair labor practice depending on
whether or not the statements came within the broad protection of
8(c). Therefore, it is apparent that the court's determination that
56. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.c.
§ 151 (1958).
57. 62 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
58. Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 47, at 54.
59. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, supra note 14.
60. See San Diego Bldg. & Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 18.
61. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958), which provides in relevant
part that "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, [or] printed . . . form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal, or force, or promise of benefit."
62. CCH, LABoR LAW CoUvsR ff 1704 (14th ed. 1964).
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the alleged defamation was arguably subject to section 8(c) adds
nothing to its opinion.6
While the court's reliance on 8(c) was somewhat misplaced, its
reasoning that a conflict between competing remedies may well result
if state courts are allowed to assert jurisdiction over a libel action
arising out of an organizational campaign is well founded. Although
representation proceedings are not unfair labor practice proceedings,
the Board is often called upon to determine the truth or falsity of
statements made during the campaign in order to find whether the
statements in question have so impaired the employees' freedom of
choice that the preceding election must be set aside. 64 To allow a
state court to award damages for libel in a situation where the
Board might find the allegedly libellous statements to be truthful
would be to condone the very conflict condemned by Garner6 5 and,
at the very least, would allow "two law-making sources to govern,"
a contingency proscribed by Garmon 11.66 In conclusion, it cannot
be denied that the defamed party to a labor dispute has suffered a
grievous injury to his reputation, but his remedy must be sacrificed
to the compelling necessity of promoting industrial peace.

Railroad Regulation-Section 13a(2) Interstate
Commerce Act-Standards to be Considered By
Interstate Commerce Commission in Granting
Interstate Carrier Permission To Discontinue
Intrastate Line
The North Carolina State Utilities Commission denied appellant
Southern Railway's request for permission to discontinue two of its
deficit producing intrastate passenger trains operating between
Greensboro and Goldsboro, North Carolina.' Appellant then petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission for such permission
under section 13a(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act.2 After a
63. See Schnell Tool & Die Corp. v. Local Union, United Steelworkers, 200 N.E.2d
727 (Ohio Com. P1. 1964), where the court held the alleged defamation to be
arguably subject to the protections of section 7 or the prohibitions of section 8.
64. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
65. Supra note 14.
66. 359 U.S. at 247.
1. The North Carolina State Utilities Commission's decision was affirmed by the
state supreme court in State v. Southern Ry., 254 N.C. 73, 118 S.E.2d 21 (1961).
2. Such petition is permitted under the provisions of § 13a( 2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1958), which provides: "Where the dis-
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hearing and over objections by the State of North Carolina to the
Commission's refusal to consider Southern's freight revenue on the
line and the carrier's total intrastate prosperity,3 the Commission
found that there was little public need for the passenger service,
that continued operation of the service would constitute an unjust
and undue burden upon interstate commerce, and ordered discontinuance of the trains.4 The State of North Carolina, joined by other
protestants, then brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina seeking to have the Commission's order set aside and to have Southern enjoined from discontinuing service on the line.5 The three-judge district court, while not
disagreeing with any of the Commission's findings of fact, found, as
a matter of law, that the Commission had erred in failing to consider
Southern's total intrastate prosperity. 6 The district court then set
aside the Commission's order and perpetually enjoined the carrier
from discontinuing the trains in question.7 Southern, joined by the
United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, then brought
continuance or change, in whole or in part, by a carrier or carriers subject to this
part, of the operation or service of any train or ferry operated wholly within the
boundaries of a single State is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of any State
or where the State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition duly filed with it by said carrier or carriers for authority to discontinue or change, in whole or in part, the operation or service of any such train or ferry
or shall not have acted finally on such an application or petition within one hundred
and twenty days from the presentation thereof, such carrier or carriers may petition
the Commission for authority to effect such discontinuance or change. The Commission
may grant such authority only after full hearing and upon findings by it that (a) the
present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance or
change, in whole or in part, of the operation or service of such train or ferry, and
(b) the continued operation or service of such train or ferry without discontinuance
or change, in whole or in part, will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the
interstate operations of such carrier or carriers or upon interstate commerce. When
any petition shall be filed with the Commission under the provisions of this paragraph
the Commission shall notify the Governor of the State in which such train or ferry is
operated at least thirty days in advance of the hearing provided for in this paragraph,
and such hearing shall be held by the Commission in the State in which such train
or ferry is operated; and the Commission is authorized to avail itself of the cooperation,
services, records and facilities of the authorities in such State in the performance of its
functions under this paragraph."
3. In the year preceding its petition to the State Utilities Commission Southern
sustained a $90,000 loss on its passenger service between Greensboro and Goldsboro,
North Carolina, while it made a profit on the freight service between the two points
of $600,000, and a profit of $36,000,000 for the year on its entire system. North
Carolina contended that the Commission should consider Southern's freight revenue
and its entire profits, in which case the loss on the particular passenger service would
have seemed inconsequential in comparison.
4. Southern Railway Discontinuance of Service Between Greensboro and Goldsboro,
N.C., 317 I.C.C. 255, 260 (1962).
5. North Carolina v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 675 (M.D.N. C. 1962).
6. Id.at 689.

7. Ibid.
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the present appeal to the Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The
Commission did not err in giving little weight to the overall prosperity of Southern's intrastate activities in its determination that

continued operation of the unprofitable trains would constitute a
burden upon interstate commerce. The Commission is not required,
under section 13a(2), to consider a carrier's total intrastate prosperity
when there is little public need for the service sought to be discontinued. When there is evidence of significant public need for the
service in question, however, the Commission must give weight
to the carrier's total intrastate operations and such weight may vary,
depending upon the circumstances of public convenience and necessity in each case. Southern Ry. v. United States, 376 U.S. 93 (1964).
Prior to 1958, the Interstate Commerce Commission's authority
over intrastate carrier operations was limited to cases involving com-

plete abandonment of an unprofitable line which burdened interstate
commerce 8 or adjustment of intrastate rates burdening or discriminating against interstate commerce. 9 The Commission was not em-

8. 24 Stat. 379 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1958), provides: "[N]o carrier by
railroad subject to this part shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad, or the
construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of railroad,
or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation under this part over or by means
of such additional or extended line of railroad, unless and until there shall first
have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public
convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or
construction and operation, of such additional or extended line of railroad, and no
carrier by railroad subject to this part shall abandon all or any portion of a line of
railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained
from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and
necessity permit of such abandonment ......
24 Stat. 379 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1958), provides: "The application for and
issuance of any such certificate shall be under such rules and regulations as to
hearings and other matters as the Commission may from time to time prescribe, and
the provisions of this part shall apply to all such proceedings .... "
24 Stat. 379 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1958) provides: "The Commission shall
have power to isiue such certificate as prayed for, or to refuse to issue it, or to
issue it for a portion or portions of a line of railroad, or extension thereof, described
in the application, or for the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may
attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment
the public convenience and necessity may require .... "
9. 24 Stat. 383 (1910), 49 U.S.C. § 13(4) (1958), provides: "Whenever in any
such investigation the commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare,
charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable
advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate
commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand,
or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign
commerce [which the Commission may find without a separation of interstate and
intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the
operations or results thereof of any carrier, or group or groups of carriers, wholly within
any State] which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe
the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum,
thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be
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powered to authorize discontinuance of a particular unprofitable
intrastate segment while allowing the rest of the line to continue
operating.10 In 1958, Congress filled this gap with the enactment of
section 13a(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act." Section 13a(2)
provides that the Commission may authorize a carrier to discontinue
a particular service if "the present or future public convenience and
necessity permit of such discontinuance . . ." and if continued operation of the train "will constitute an unjust or undue burden
upon .
." the carrier's interstate operations or upon interstate
commerce. 12 The statute does not indicate, however, whether the
Commission must consider the carrier's total intrastate operations
when it decides if continued operation of the train would burden
interstate commerce.
A power analogous to that granted the Commission under section
13a(2) is its authority to permit complete abandonment of an unprofitable intrastate line under sections 1(18) through 1(20).13 The
general guideline followed by the Commission in making determinations under sections 1(18) through 1(20) is that such determination
to permit abandonment be consistent with public convenience and
necessity. 14 The interstate burden should be determined "upon a
balancing of the respective interests-the effort being to decide what
fairness to all concerned demands." 15 Section 13(4), another related
section of the Interstate Commerce Act, grants the Commission
authority over intrastate rates which cause unjust discrimination
against, or undue burden on, interstate commerce. This section
observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference,
prejudice, or discrimination ....
"
10. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern By., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Board
of Pub. Util. Comm'n v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 106 (D.C.N.J. 1957); Gulf,
M. & O.R.R. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 120 F. Supp. 250 (D.C. La. 1954);
Southern Ry. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Conm'n, 31 F. Supp. 707 (E.D.S.C. 1940).
11. 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1958). That the Court considers that congressional enactment of this section was with the intention of filling this gap, see
New Jersey v. New York S. & W.R.R., 372 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1963). For a general discussion of passenger train discontinuances which prior to 1958 were not subject to
Commission action, see Conant, Railroad Service Discontinuances, 43 MiNN. L. REV.
275(1958).
12. 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1958). For full text, see note 2 supra.
13. 24 Stat. 379 (1906), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18) through 1(20) (1958). For full text,
see note 8, supra.
14. 24 Stat. 379 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1958). For cases in which the statutory
standard has been interpreted and applied, see Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S.
153 (1926); Burke County v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ga. 1962).
Note that the term "public convenience and necessity" has not been specifically
defined by the courts. The courts instead have relied on the expertise of the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine each case on an ad hoc basis, thus giving
to the Commission very wide discretion to decide whether the requirements of "public
convenience and necessity" are met under the circumstances presented in each case.
15. Colorado v. United States, supra note 14, at 169.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

specifies that the Commission may determine the question of burden
upon interstate commerce without considering total intrastate prosperity.16 The Commission has discretion under these two related
sections,' 7 sections 1(18) through 1(20) and 13(4), to determine
how much weight, if any, is to be accorded the carrier's total intrastate prosperity when determining whether interstate commerce is
burdened.
The instant case is the first to reach the Supreme Court concerning
the criteria to be applied by the Commission in a discontinuance
proceeding under section 13a(2). 18 Section 13a(2) does not specify
the factors the Commission is to consider in deciding whether to
permit discontinuance; therefore, the Court examined standards followed by the Commission in deciding cases under sections 1(18)
through 1(20) and 13(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, since
these sections grant the Commission povers closely related to those
granted under section 13a(2). The Court looked first to section
13(4), which permits the Commission to decide questions arising
under it without considering the carrier's total intrastate prosperity.
The Court noted that the district court had relied heavily upon two
1958 cases in which the Court had held that under section 13(4) the
Commission was required to weigh the carrier's total intrastate prosperity. 19 Following these two decisions2° however, Congress amended
section 13(4) to permit Commission discretion as to whether or not
the carrier's total intrastate prosperity should be considered.2 1 In the
16. 24 Stat. 383 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 13(4) (1958).
17. These sections are related to § 13a(2) in that (1) the Commission has authority
over a strictly intrastate operation or practice, which authority is premised upon the
superceding federal interest in an efficient national transportation system; (2) a
determination under the sections requires Commission judgment as to the amount
of burden caused to interstate commerce by a particular intrastate activity, and this
judgment involves a decision as to whether the federal interest involved is great
enough to supercede state interests; (3) similar interests are affected under the three
sections when the Commission determines that there is a burden to interstate commerce, namely, (a) under § 1(18) the convenience of state travelers would be
lessened by abandonment of a railroad line, (b) under § 13(4) an upward adjustment of an intrastate rate would affect the economic interest of state travelers, and
(c) under § 13a(2) some of the train riding public would suffer some inconvenience
through discontinuance of a particular train.
18. Southern Ry. v. United States, 376 U.S. 93, 106 (1964).
19. Id. at 98. The two cases upon which the district court had relied were Public
Serv. Comm'n v. United States, 356 U.S. 421 (1958), and Chicago M. St. P.R. v.
Illinois, 355 U.S. 300 (1958).
20. Ibid.
21. The amendment added to this section the parenthetical portion, "(which the
Commission may find without a separation of interstate and intrastate property,
revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results
thereof of any carrier, or group or groups of carriers wholly within any State) ....
72 Stat. 570, 49 U.S.C. § 13(4) (1958). That the amendment to this section was in
direct response to the Public Service Comm'n case, supra note 19, and the Chicago
case, supra note 19, see U.S. CODE, CONe. & AD.NEws 3483-86 (1958).
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proceeding below, the district court had concluded that since section
13(4) was thus amended in the same year in which section 13a(2)
was enacted, Congress, had it intended that the Commission be
allowed the same discretion under section 13a(2) as is allowed under
section 13(4), would have specifically provided therefor.22 The
Court rejected this argument and pointed out that the enactment
of the section 13(4) amendment merely reflected congressional reaffirmance of what Congress had conceived as the original intent
of that section; there is, therefore, no reason to conclude that it
represents a new standard which must be specifically incorporated
into every statutory provision to which it was intended to apply. 23
In determining 'that the Commission did not err by failing to consider
the carrier's intrastate prosperity, the Court applied to the instant
case the guideline for Commission action under sections 1(18)
through 1(20), which had been drawn in the case of Colorado v.
United States.24 The Court pointed out that it has "long recognized
that the Commission may properly give varying weights to the overall prosperity of the carrier in differing situations . ."
and quoting
from the Colorado case, said: 26
In many cases it is clear that the extent of the whole traffic, the degree of
dependence of the communities directly affected upon the particular means
of transportation, and other attendant conditions, are such that the carrier
may not justly be required to continue to bear the financial loss necessarily
entailed by operation. In some cases ... the question is whether abandon-

ment may justly be permitted, in view of the fact that it would subject

the communities directly affected to serious injury while continued operation would impose a relatively light burden upon a prosperous carrier.

In applying this standard, the Court concluded that where the public
need is great,r the Commission would err if it did not give considerable weight to the carrier's ,total prosperity and its ability to absorb
the deficit which may result from the unprofitable services. 28 It would
be equally proper, said the Court, for the Commission to give little
weight to the carrier's overall prosperity when the demands of public
necessity and convenience are slight.29
22. North Carolina v. United States, supra note 5, at 682.
23. Southern Ry. v. United States, supra note 18, at 99-100.
24. Supra note 14, at 153.
25. Southern Ry. v. United States, supra note 18, at 104-05.
26. Id. at 105.
27. The Commission determines the public need under § 13a(2). The statute
provides "upon findings by it [Commission] that (a) the present or future public
convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance ......
72 Stat. 571, 49
U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1958).
28. Southern Ry. v. United States, supra note 18, at 105.
29. Ibid.
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The Court's decision properly leaves with the Interstate Commerce Commission the discretion it should have in administering
section 13a(2). To require the Commission to consider a carrier's
total intrastate operations in each case arising under section 13a(2)
would impose a standard too rigid to allow efficient Commission action
in the variety of cases which may arise under that section. Deciding
how greatly interstate commerce is burdened by a particular unprofitable intrastate service necessarily involves a balancing of interests whose significance may vary greatly from case to case. The
flexible standards of sections 1(18) through 1(20) and 13(4) permit
Commission discretion to disregard total intrastate carrier prosperity
and it therefore seems reasonable that the Commission should have
the same degree of discretion under the related section, section
13a(2).

State Taxation-Commerce Clause-Unapportioned
Privilege Tax Measured by Gross Receipts on
Wholesale Sales of a Multistate Business
Suit was brought by a Delaware corporation to enjoin the State
of Washington from collecting a privilege tax, measured by total
gross sales receipts, which was levied on wholesale sales of automobiles, parts, and accessories manufactured in California, Missouri,
and Michigan, and shipped f.o.b. from a warehouse in Portland,
Oregon, to customers in Washington. As part of this corporation's
sales organization, zone offices were maintained in various geographical regions' with district managers contacting independent
dealers, normally at the dealer's local place of business. The district
managers gave advice regarding inventory, coordinated incentive programs, and counselled in the improvement of sales and services. Two
divisions of the corporation maintained no offices in the state. However, division personnel usually resided in their Washington districts
and often used their residences for receipt of business mail and for
business phone calls. Orders normally went directly from the dealer
to the warehouse which shipped the goods.2 The Washington State
1. The state of Washington is part of the Portland zone, a subdivision of the Western
region, which also includes Oregon, Idaho, Alaska, and portions of Montana and
Wyoming.
2. The disputed taxes in this case concerned four divisions of the General Motors
organization-Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Chevrolet, and General Motors Parts Division.
The Pontiac and Oldsmobile divisions maintained no offices in Washington. The
Chevrolet division maintained a one-man branch office in Seattle which served the
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Tax Commission levied a tax on the gross receipts from these wholesale sales.3 Although goods were also shipped from a Seattle warehouse and through a Seattle office of two other divisions, only the
taxes measured by the gross proceeds from the f.o.b. sales of the
Portland warehouse to the dealers in Washington were disputed.
The Washington Superior Court granted injunctive relief against
collection of the tax on these sales. On appeal the Washington
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax bore a reasonable relation to the appellant's activities within the state.4 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Where taxable business is so mingled
with that business claimed nontaxable, absent the showing of an
actual multiple burden on commerce, an unapportioned gross receipts tax on wholesale sales of a multi-state business is valid where
resident employees perform substantial services in relation to an
interstate business channelled through a maze of local connections.
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), rehearing

denied, 379 U.S. 875 (1964).
The doctrine that total gross receipts from interstate commerce
may not be made the subject of a state tax 5 has led the Supreme
northern counties of Washington; the rest of the state was served by the Portland
office. The General Motors Parts Division maintained warehouses in Seattle and Portland. The Seattle warehouse carried the "heavy volume" items, while those less
frequently ordered were stocked in the Portland warehouse. Each dealer was furnished
with two order blanks-one for each warehouse.
3. Relevant sections of the Washington statute in force during the taxable periods
in this case, January 1, 1949, through June 30, 1953, were:
"Section 4. From and after the first day of May, 1935, there is hereby levied and
there shall be collected from every person a tax for the act or privilege of engaging in
business activities. Such tax shall be measured by the application of rates against
value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as the case
may be, as follows:
"(e) Upon every person ... engaging within this state in the business of making sales
at wholesale; as to such persons the amount of the tax with respect to such business
shall be equal to the gross proceeds of sales of such business multiplied by the rate of
one-quarter of one per cent;
"Section 5. For the purposes of this title...
;(e) The term 'sale at wholesale' or 'wholesale sale means any sale of tangible
personal property and any sale of or charge made for labor and services rendered in
respect to real or personal property, which is not a sale at retail;
"(f) The term 'gross proceeds of sales' means the value proceeding or accruing from
the sale of tangible personal property and/or for services rendered without any deduction on account of the cost of property sold, the cost of materials used, labor costs,
interest, discount paid, delivery costs, taxes, or any other expense whatsoever paid or
accrued and without any deduction on account of losses." Wash. Laws 1949, ch.
228, at 814-19.
4. General Motors v. State, 60 Wash. 2d 862, 376 P.2d 843 (1962).
5. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Postal Telegraph Cable
Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895); Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122
U.S. 326 (1887).
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Court to invalidate many unapportioned gross receipts taxes on interstate commerce. 6 The basis of the doctrine is that since commerce
cannot be taxed, neither can its gross receipts. 7 Interstate business,
however, is not immune from all state taxation. The conflict between

the revenue requirements of the states and the national economy's
need for the free flow of commerce" has been accommodated by allowing states to tax multi-state business when the requirements of both
due process and the commerce clause are satisfied.9 In holding a tax
valid under the due process clause the courts seek to determine
whether sufficient contact exists between the particular transactions

sought to be taxed and the protection, opportunities, and benefits
given by the state to support the finding of a taxable in-state "inci-

dent" distinct from commerce itself.10 This connection has been

termed a "nexus.""
Although a state may have a substantial relationship with the

activity sought to be taxed, the tax still must meet the requirements13
of the commerce clause. 12 Activities such as the solicitation of sales

6. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Puget Sound
Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Galveston, Harrisburg
& San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908); Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, supra note 5; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
7. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917); Postal Telegraph Cable
Co. v. Adams, supra note 5; Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 5;
Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1874) (dissent).
8. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 259 (1938). But of. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946),
where the Court said that a state was precluded from taking any action which may
fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of commerce. "It is
immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance . . . [since] to
compare a State's treatment of its local trade with the exertion of its authority against
commerce in the national domain is to compare incomparables." Id. at 252.
9. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal,
46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1058-65 (1960).
10. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, supra note 8; Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, supra note 8; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 8. Cf. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., supranote 10.
12. See HARTmrAN, STATE TAx, noN OF INTRmsTATE CoimEacE 13-17 (1953). "The
situation is difficult to think of in which some incident of an interstate transaction taking
place within a State could not be segregated by an act of mental gymnastics and
made the fulcrum of . . . [a] tax. All interstate commerce takes place within the
confines of the States and necessarily involves 'incidents' occurring within each State
through which it passes or with which it is connected in fact. And there is no known
limit to the human mind's capacity to carve out from what is an entire or integral
economic process particular phases or incidents, label them as 'separate and distinct'
or 'local,' and thus achieve its desired result." Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416,
423 (1946).
13. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). See also Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923), and cases cited therein at 515.
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and the loading and unloading of cargo 14 are considered an essential
and integral non-taxable part of interstate commerce; whereas multistate operations, channelled through local outlets to gain the advantages of a local business, have been held to be incidents subject
to the state's sovereign power of taxation.'5 Taxes allowed on such
17
16
in-state incidents have included net income taxes, property taxes,
use taxes, 18 license fees on manufacturing, 19 license taxes, 20 franchise

taxes,2 ' privilege taxes, z2 and gross receipts taxes apportioned to a
reasonable percentage of business done within the state.23 The vir-

tual impossibility of perfect apportionment 24 has been recognized by
the Supreme Court, which has been reluctant to nullify honest state
attempts at fairness.25 If the apportionment result is reasonable, the
states have been permitted to use interstate2 and out-of-state

7

trans-

actions as the measures of many gross receipts tax formulas. The
validity of these formulas have been determined under two tests28 that

attempt to equalize the tax burdens of interstate commerce with those
of local business.2 Under the "direct-indirect burden" test of the
validity of taxes affecting interstate commerce,3 0 generally only those
gross receipts taxes levied directly on the commerce itself, as distin-

guished from excise taxes levied on local events and measured by gross
14. Joseph v. Carter &Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
15. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951). For the view that
all immunity is lost under these circumstances see the dissent of Clark, J., Id. at 541.
16. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
17. Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934).
18. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
19. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
20. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
21. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
22. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 8.
23. In Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948), a common
carrier challenged the validity of a New York gross receipts tax on the transportation
of passengers between two points within the state over a route 42.53 per cent of which
was in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It was held that the tax was valid on that portion
of the gross receipts which equalled the ratio the mileage of roads within the state
bore to the total amount of mileage. However, the tax on gross receipts from that
portion of the mileage outside the taxing state burdened interstate commerce in
violation of the commerce clause. See Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations
on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REv. 953, 1011 (1962), for an
examination of the various formulas of apportioning gross receipts taxes.
24. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 423 (1947); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157, 161 (1940).
25. Ibid.
26. Supra note 24.
27. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944);
American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, supra note 19.
28. HAR

AN, op. cit. supra note 12.

29. Id. at 110, 112.
30. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 7; Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, supra note 5. See also Hartman, supra note 9, at 1070.
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receipts, constitute undue burdens on, or regulations of, interstate
commerce. 31 Taxes on local events have been conceded to affect
the subjects and operations of the commerce "yet it is not everything that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it, within
the meaning of the Constitution." 32 Under this test the Court has
invalidated all unapportioned gross receipts taxes on interstate business.3 Application of this classical standard in the present case would
seem to invalidate this unapportioned wholesaler's privilege tax
measured by gross sales receipts. Since it is impossible to engage in
interstate commerce without disposing of goods, wholesaling should
be considered a continuation of commerce or one of its essential
parts. Therefore, the instant excise on wholesaling would seem to
be a levy on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and
thus a direct unconstitutional burden.4
Justice Stone was the chief architect of another test, known as the
"multiple burdens" theory,35 for determining the validity of a tax
when the challenge is on commerce clause grounds. Under this test
interstate business is not immune from a state or local tax merely
because the excise is levied upon interstate commerce or its receipts.
Rather, such taxes are invalid only if the courts find that they subject interstate commerce to a "risk of multiple taxation not borne by
local commerce."36 (Italics supplied.) The question normally to be
answered is whether another state can tax the same event. If this
question is answered in the negative, state taxation is permitted when
the levies are apportioned by means which are reasonably designed
to measure the state's connection with the receipts, income, or property sought to be taxed. Justice Rutledge further amplified and
expounded on this doctrine. In his concurring opinion in International
Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury37 he stated that the states,
by virtue of the commerce clause, could not impose upon interstate
31. HELL=mrEN, STATE AND LocAL TAxATzON 160 (1961).
32. Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 7, at 293.
33. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, supra note 13; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania,
supra note 7.
34. Cf. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., supra note 14; Bobbins v.
Shelby County Taxing Dist., supra note 13. International Harvester Co. v. Department
of Treasury, supra note 27, held that a state gross income tax (in effect a gross receipts
tax) was validly applied to business transactions of an interstate business which were
wholly consummated within the taxing state's borders as long as local transactions were
subject to the same taxes. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940), held that a city could validly require an interstate business to collect a transfer
of property tax from the purchaser and be liable itself for any taxes not collected. Both
of these cases are distinguishable from the tax in the present case since it was levied
on the interstate transactions of the multi-state business itself.
35. HELr.LusTEir, op. cit. supranote 31, at 161.

36. Ibid.
37. 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
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commerce tax burdens not borne by local business. Where the
practical effect of taxes actually levied by more than one state upon
an interstate transaction is to subject it to a cumulative tax burden
which is greater than that imposed upon local business, there exists
a burden upon interstate commerce that is prohibited by the commerce clause under this test. Since the commerce clause operates
independently of the states' taxing discretion, this test also applies
when other states have the right, constitutionally apart from the commerce clause, to tax the same transaction, with the risk of these states
exercising this right being a sufficient burden not borne by local
business. The multiple burdens test requires extinguishment of the
danger of multiple taxation by having the tax of one state give
credit for any levy paid to another state, or by apportioning the
measure of each tax so that the exaction of each taxing state reflects
only that commercial activity fairly attributable to it.n
In the present case, application of this standard would subject
the Washington tax to invalidation. Since a substantial part of the
activities from which the receipts were derived was carried on outside the taxing state, the tax should have been apportioned so that
only that segment of the commercial flow reflecting the values attributable to the taxing state could be used as the measure of the
tax. Failure to apportion a privilege tax has been considered tantamount to extraterritorial taxing when applied to a multi-state business; and the risk of other states taxing the contributing activities
which take place within their borders, also measured by the "entire
amount of commerce," has been held to be a prohibitive cumulative
burden. 39 In the instant case another state could easily tax a contributing activity-the manufacture, for example-and measure it by
a portion of the gross receipts. 40 Other cases have held that the
same event must be capable of taxation by other states for the commerce to be exposed to prohibited cumulative burdens. 41 Here the
sales took place in Oregon and that state has the right to tax the
same event-the privilege of making these same wholesale salesthereby creating the risk of a multiple burden. In the present case
the Court refused to pass upon the question of multiple burdens because the appellant-taxpayer had not demonstrated that similar taxes
of other states actually subjected the same event to burdens not borne
by local business. This necessity of the demonstration of an actual
38. Id. at 358-62.
39. Gwin, White &Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, supra note 6.
40. See MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 7.557(3) (1955); Mo. REv. STAT. § 92.040 (1939).
41. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, supra note 24; Coverdale v. ArkansasLouisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938). See HARmA, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 188-99.
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burden is yet a stricter requirement of proof to show the existence of
a "multiple burden," and appears to be subjecting the commerce
clause to the whimsical contingencies of state taxation 42 as well as
establishing a first-come-first-tax 43 concept whereby the state which
first taxes the event has a valid tax. Another state attempting to
exercise its constitutional right to tax the same event would appear
to be precluded from any such levy since the taxpayer could demonstrate the prior tax of the first state as an actual burden not borne
by local business and invoke the protection of the commerce clause
under the cumulative burdens test recognized by this Court.44
The majority of the Court concluded that this privilege tax
measured by unapportioned gross receipts was levied on the incident
of a local business. Recognizing that interstate commerce could not
be burdened by local taxes which would subject it to the danger of
"multiple taxation," the decision rested "upon whether the State ...
[was] exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation." 4 The five
justices that upheld the tax believed the excise to be in proper
proportion to the activities and benefits that the interstate business
incurred within the state of Washington. The homes of resident
personnel substituted for in-state offices, 46 and their in-state activities
in relation to the establishment and maintenance of sales upon which
the tax was based were sufficient local incidents upon which to levy
a tax.47 The "bundle of corporate activity" test 48 was applied and
satisfied by the total enmeshment of the interstate phase of the business with local connections. The Court demonstrated this enmeshment by pointing to appellant's voluntary payment of taxes on the
sales channelled through one of its division's local offices 49 and from
the Seattle warehouse.50 Under these circumstances the majority
42. Cf. "Unlawfulness of the burden depends upon its nature, measured in terms
of its capacity to obstruct interstate commerce, and not on the contingency that some
other state may first have subjected the commerce to a like burden." Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, supra note 6, at 340.
43. 377 U.S. at 458 &n.2 (1964) (dissent).
44. 377 U.S. at 440.
45. Ibid.
46. Cf. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 15.
47. The majority cited Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 15 which
held that while interstate business could not be channelled through local outlets to
gain the advantages of a local business and still claim the immunities of interstate
commerce, orders sent directly to the out-of-state supplier, filled, and then sent directly
back to the in-state consumer were too clearly interstate to be taxable. For a detailed
comparison of the fact patterns of these two cases see the dissent of Mr. Justice Goldberg
in the instant case. 377 U.S. at 452-56.
48. Id. at 447.
49. Id. at 445.
50. Id. at 446.
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believed that the taxpayer must show that the operations claimed
nontaxable were disassociated from the local business and clearly
interstate in nature.
There were two dissenting opinions. Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent
conceded that the authority cited by the majority was sufficient to
support the finding that the due process requirements were satisfied.
However, he took the position that the commerce clause requirement had been completely ignored by the Court. The commerce
clause requires that the tax be apportioned to reflect the commercial
activity relevant to the particular transaction being taxed and no
amount of sales volume will overcome this requirement. Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice White joined Mr. Justice Goldberg in a
forcible dissent denouncing the majority's radical departure from what
they considered established principles as applied in the Norton5'
case. This dissent considered both factual patterns comparable and
had no difficulty in applying the Norton standard. It contended that
the Court here has established an unworkable, vague, and indefinite
standard of "fairness" which could easily result in the multiple taxation of the receipts of interstate commerce. Furthermore, this dissent
found actual discrimination against interstate commerce in the statute
itself, which, prior to 1950, exempted from this wholesaling tax a
Washington manufacturer-wholesaler who had paid a manufacturing
tax levied by the state of Washington. 52 Although legislation reversed this exemption in 1950, the dissenting Justices believed the
economic effects to be so similar as to discriminate against multi-state
business. They believed that the failure of the Washington statute to
exempt from the wholesaling tax businesses which paid manufacturing
taxes of other states, which are also measured by gross sales receipts,
was discrimination against interstate business. The validity of this
last contention is questionable since the normal standard of whether
or not a tax is discriminatory is whether other related levies of the
state impose equal burdens upon local commerce. 53 The measure
of the manufacturing tax 54 in Washington is the same as that of the
wholesaling tax. No one can doubt a state's inherent sovereign power
to determine what it shall tax, subject to constitutional limitations
and, in the case of the post-1950 Washington manufacturer-wholesaler, it appears that Washington had chosen not to tax the manu51. Supra note 15.
52. Compare REv. CoDE WAsn. § 82.04.270 (1961); Wash. Laws 1949, ch. 228,
§ 1(e), with REV. CoDE WAsH. § 82.04.240; Wash. Laws 1949, ch. 228 § 1(b), and
Rav. CODE WAsH. § 82.04.440 (1961); Wash. Laws 1949, ch. 228, § 2-A.
53. HARTmAN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 67-70.
54. The manufacturing tax is measured by the value of the goods which is equal to
the gross proceeds of sales at wholesale or retail prices. Thus, the two taxes are equal
but levied upon different events. REv. CODE WAsH. §§ 82.04.240, 82.04.450 (1961).
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facturing aspect of the operation so as to equalize the imposition of
actual tax within its taxing scheme. 55
A noted writer has stated that a "tax might satisfy due process
requirements and yet transgress the commerce clause . . . . There
have, however, apparently been no cases expressly deciding that a
tax will withstand a due process assault and yet fall before the
commerce clause." 56 This proposition is further substantiated by this
case. The standard here promulgated by the Court may easily lead
to the virtual extinction of the commerce clause as a restraining force
in the area of state taxation of multi-state activities. The "bundle of
corporate activity test" is only concerned with due process and, as
applied in the present case, appears to be relegating the commerce
clause to impotence in its purpose of preventing internal trade barriers.57 The rationale of this decision indicates that even if the operations of a multi-state business are clearly interstate save for one
small segment, that local outlet makes the entire operation of the

business within the state vulnerable to state privilege taxes. Stated
briefly, this means that no diversified multi-state business will be able
to segregate its interstate and intrastate operations in the future for
the purposes of state taxationO unless it can be shown that the
interstate transactions are actually subjected to taxes of other states. 9
55. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. State, 45 Wash. 2d 749, 278 P.2d 305 (1954).
56. HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 17.
57. "The multiplication of state taxes measured by the gross receipts from interstate
transactions would spell the destruction of interstate commerce and renew the barriers
to interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce clause to remove." Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 8, at 256. Cf. Gwin, White & Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford, supra note 6.
58. Interstate Commerce, Taxation Without Apportionment, 24 Coap. J. 123, 126
(1964).
59. The fact that General Motors was subject to a heavier tax burden than similar
Washington business, and unable to demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that a
multiple tax burden existed, demonstrates the awesome task facing any multi-state
business which seeks to challenge a state tax of this nature. The "bundle of corporate
activity" test as applied in this case does not appear to be a rule easily applied, and the
validity of taxes tested by this standard undoubtedly will depend upon taxing policies
of states other than the one imposing the tax. Assume that a substantial enough
business is carried on within the following states to satisfy the due process requirement for the bundle of corporate activity test, and then consider the following fact
patterns. State A has a privilege tax similar to Washington's, but state B has none.
X corporation does a business similar to that of General Motors in the instant case.
The result is that state A has a valid tax. (This is the holding of the instant case.)
Now assume the same facts except that state B also has a privilege tax. The result is
that either state A or state B, or both, no longer have a valid tax as applied to X
corporation. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. However, if Y corporation
does an interstate business between State C (which has no privilege tax) and state A,
and between states C and B, but not between states A and B, then both state A and
state B have valid privilege taxes in respect to Y corporation although their taes may
be invalid as applied to X corporation. The standard is thus completely dependent
upon the taxing policies of the states in which the affected multi-state business has a
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A logical solution for large corporations would be to fragmentize and
localize their operations so as to preclude the risk of multiple taxation, a result inconsistent with the "economic whole United States"
theory of the commerce clause.6 0

Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Application of Federal
Tax Liens to Insurance Policy Automatic Premium
Loan and Cash Surrender Provisions
In Sullivan v. United States,' the leading case of the group to be
discussed, the federal government brought an action under section
7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19542 in federal district court
against taxpayer-insured and her insurers 3 to foreclose a federal tax
lien 4 on two unmatured life insurance policies of the taxpayer's, and
taxable incident. The only ascertainable rule which develops is that before a state may
tax a multi-state business it must examine the taxing policies of each state in which the
business sought to be taxed operates. It is submitted that the states are unlikely to make
such an examination of each business which they seek to tax, and will probably tax all
business within their borders. Such a result will require the involved business to examine
all of the taxes it pays on the contributing activities of the taxed operation to determine
whether it is being subjected to discriminatory multiple taxation not borne by local
business. The determination of whether the tax is discriminatory can probably only
be solved by litigation construing the tax burden of the multi-state business at the time
of the trial. Should a change in taxing policies of the involved states adversely affect
the business at a later time, it may well find itself again in court asking for a redetermination of the same tax. The practicality of such a rule is severely criticized in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Goldberg, 377 U.S. at 457-62, where he submits that the only
result of such a rule will be a wholly permissive attitude by the courts toward state
taxation of interstate business except for mail order houses which do not satisfy the due
process requirement of a taxable incident.
60. There is evidence that General Motors established a Seattle office for these other
two divisions after the initial levy of the Washington tax. See 38 WASH. L. Rlv. 277
n.3 (1963). Could one of the reasons have been to preclude Oregon from having any
base upon which to levy a tax concerning these wholesale sales?
1. 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964). Companion cases are cited in note 13 infra.
2. Section 7403 authorizes suits to foreclose federal tax liens.
3. Aetna Life Insurance Company hereinafter referred to as Aetna, and Manufacturer's Life Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as Manufacturer's are
the two insurers. Although the Aetna policy was an endowment type and the Manufacturer's was ordinary life, the policies were substantially identical in all material
respects.
4. The lien arose under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 36, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448, which
is virtually identical to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 6321. The latter reads as follows:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or
assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall
be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
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to collect penalties from the insurers. These penalties, which arise
under section 6332(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,5 were
for the amount of decrease in the cash surrender values 6 of the
policies occasioned by the operation of the policy loan 7 and automatic
premium loan 8 provisions. In 1952, the Commissioner assessed a

deficiency against the taxpayer and her spouse jointly for the taxable

year 1950 and filed public notice 9 of the resulting lien.10 In 1953,
both insurers issued policies on the life of taxpayer who, retaining the
right to exercise all.rights of ownership incident thereto," designated
her husband as beneficiary. Subsequent to the filing of public notice
of the government tax lien but prior to delivery of actual notice of
5. INT. R1Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(b):
"(b) PEArALTY FOR Viox rtor.-Any person who fails or refuses to surrender as
required by subsection (a) [requires any person in possession of property subject to
levy to surrender it on demand of Secretary] and property or rights to property, subject
to levy, upon demand by the Secretary or his delegate, shall be liable in his own
person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the value of the property
or rights not so surrendered, but not exceeding the amount of the taxes for the collection of which such levy has been made, together with costs and interest on such sum
at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of such levy."
6. The cash surrender value is defined as the cash value, that part of the total
premium paid which exceeds the insurer's accrued policy costs plus accumulated
dividend amounts, less any outstanding policy indebtedness previously incurred by the
insured to the insurer. The right to a cash surrender value is one of the incidents of
ownership to which the insured was entitled and could be exercised only by surrendering the policy to the company.
7. The right to borrow on the policy is a second incident of ownership to which
the insured was entitled and would result in a first lien held by the insurer on the
policy. Under neither policy was there a specific obligation to repay the amount
borrowed. Failure to repay simply resulted in the permanent reduction in the cash
surrender value. Once these arrearages equalled the cash value, the policy was
cancelled and obligations on both sides ceased.
8. This provision was optional but insured elected to have it included as part of
her policy. On default of premium, the company, so long as a cash surrender value
remained, would loan to the insured and apply toward payment the amount due.
9. The court did not deem it necessary to recite in which counties notice was filed.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
11. Insured retained the right to change the beneficiary. For explanation of cash
surrender value see note 6 supra. For explanation of insured's right to policy loans
see note 7 supra. For explanation of insured's revocable right to automatic premium
loans see note 8 supra.
The policies also provided insured with non-forfeiture benefits. In the event of
default of premiums each policy could be continued at the election of the insured to
the extent of its cash surrender value either as participating paid-up insurance or as
non-participating extended term insurance. Since Mrs. Sullivan elected the automatic
premium loan provision, these benefits are only of secondary interest, yet the clause is
somewhat relevant in that she could have revoked the automatic premium loan
provision at any time.
A further right held by the insured was a right to dividends. Mrs. Sullivan elected
to receive these in cash. After notice of levy was served on the insurance companies
they paid these amounts to the government without dispute. No argument has arisen
as to the disposition of this money.
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levy 12 to the insurers (January, 1958), taxpayer received benefit of
two automatic premium loans from Aetna and two policy loans from
Manufacturer's. Then, after actual notice of levy was received
(January, 1958) but before this suit was commenced (October, 1958),
each company made an automatic premium loan, as they again did
after this suit had begun. Prior to judgment in the lower court and
pursuant to a stipulation between the government and the Sullivans,
in January of 1960, the insured surrendered her policies to the insurers and released them from all liability to her on the policies.
The lower court then held that the government was entitled to be
paid the amount of the cash surrender value as of the date of surrender and that upon payment of the respective amounts the
insurers would be wholly discharged from their policy obligations to
the government as well as to the insured. The amount in issue on
appeal is the sum deducted from the cash surrender value on account
of the automatic premium loans and policy loans effected by the
insurance companies after the tax lien had arisen. On appeal by the
government to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, held, affired. Neither the amount of automatic premium
loans effected subsequent to actual notice of levy to the insurer nor
policy loans effected subsequent to filing of public notice of lien but
prior to actual notification of levy are "property or rights to property"
against which a federal tax lien will arise. United States v. Sullivan,
333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964).
Of three companion cases, one, United States v. Wilson,13 is worthy
of note. Factually, it is identical to the Sullivan case in all material
respects except that in Wilson the insured elected, prior to the time
when the lien arose, to apply earned dividends to reduce premium
payments. Also, he did not voluntarily surrender the policies and
release the insurer prior to judgment. Yet the lower court held that
the insurer was liable to the government for the amount of the
dividends and cash value applied to premium payments at any time
after actual notice of levy was served upon him. On appeal by the
insurer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
held, reversed. The notice of levy served by the Commissioner upon
the insurer did not revoke the automatic premium loan provision or
act to demand the cash surrender value on behalf of the government
and was therefore not controlling as to whether insurer could there12. Such levy is authorized under INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331.
13. 333 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1964). The other cases are, United States v. Bankers
National Life Ins. Co., 333 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Kann, 333 F.2d

146 (3d Cir. 1964). Both were decided in accordance with Sullivan and both involved
the question of the applicability of the federal tax lien to policy loans and automatic

premium loans.
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after effectuate automatic premium loans and apply accrued dividends
to amounts outstanding on premiums. United States v. Wilson, 333
F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1964).
Because of the tripartite 4 nature of the insurance contract and
the effect modification of one's right has on another's rights in the
policy, courts have found the question whether to impose a federal
tax lien on the cash surrender value of life insurance policies a
troublesome one. The standard policy distributes incidents of ownership among the three parties in accordance with the wishes of the
insured. Exercising one such right might limit the exercise of another
right or limit an obligation of the policy the benefit of which belongs
to someone other than the one exercising it. For example, the
insured's exercise of his option to surrender the policy for cash
not only limits, but terminates the rights and duties of both the
insurer and the beneficiary. If this is done pursuant to the provisions
of the policy by the persons authorized therein, there can be no
complaint. It is only when a fourth party, e.g., the government, attempts to exercise these rights on behalf of the insured, without
authorization that judicially recognizable inequities arise. The diversity of the ownership of this "bundle of rights" has made the courts
understandably reluctant to classify as property a single right of
ownership, such as the right to the cash surrender value. Were this
not the case, the government could exercise any right that it chose to
without consideration of its effect on the other parties to the contract
so long as that right belonged to a deficient taxpayer. This is not
to say that the value of an insurance policy should not be available
to the government to satisfy tax debts, but it is important to recognize that a more sophisticated analysis is necessary when dealing
with insurance policies than when dealing with ordinary contract
rights so that the concept of their value can be discussed in terms of
established notions of "property and rights to property" for federal
tax purposes.
An insurance policy is generally considered to be property to the
insured where he holds at least a right to borrow on the policy.15
Working from this premise, the courts have apparently confused the
idea of the policy being property to the extent of the cash surrender
value and the idea of the cash surrender value itself being property.16
14. The three parties involved are the insured, the insurer, and the beneficiary.
15. United States v. Trout, 46 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal. 1942). See also, Meyer v.
United States, 375 U.S. 233 (1963); United States v. Fried, 309 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1962); Smith v. Donnelly, 65 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. La. 1946); United States v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30 (D. Conn. 1942).
16. One conceptual source of this confusion comes from the fact that the courts apply
both a state and a federal test to determine whether property exists for the purposes
of a federal tax lien. It is generally said that state law defines the existence of
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An example of such confusion is offered by the lower court decision in
Wilson.17 This problem arises because the courts have not clearly
discussed the true basis of their decisions. Presumably, whether the
cash surrender value is to be classified 'as property for the purposes
of the federal tax lien, should depend upon the ramifications of so
categorizing it. If the cash surrender value itself is held to be property
as of any date prior to surrender of the policy or death of the insured
the court in effect would be interfering with the internal workings' 8
of the insurance contract since the fixing of the value of the policy to
the insured by considering it property would in effect cancel any
options on which the parties had agreed that would, were they in
operation, have had the effect of diminishing the cash surrender
value.19 If on the other hand the policy is considered property to the
extent of the cash surrender value as of the date that the cash surrender value becomes fixed in amount either by the death of the
insured, or by surrender of the policy, then the difficulties of the
previous interpretation would be avoided.1° Seen from this perspecproperty while federal law classifies it as to whether it is subject to a federal tax lien.
Thus a right or thing may be property for the purposes of state law but it may not be
property for the purposes of a tax lien under federal classification. The instant case
grapples with the problem of whether the cash surrender value is property under
the federal classification. For a good general discussion and supporting cases on the
relationship between the state test, federal classification and tax liens see, Note, 77
HAv. L. REv. 1485 (1964).
17. See text at note 13 supra.
18. United States v. Mitchell, 210 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Ala. 1962), held that the
government's serving notice of levy on the insured will not "rewrite" the insurance
contract by cancelling the automatic premium and non-forfeiture provisions. The
government has no right to exercise these options on behalf of the insured except as
authorized by court order obtained pursuant to foreclosure proceedings.
19. For example, assume that the insured had elected that the automatic premium
loan provision would go into effect on default of premium, that a federal tax lien
had arisen, and that the insured had defaulted on his premiums. The insurer, on
receiving notice of levy, would have to decide whether (1) to cancel the policy and
hold the money for the government or (2) to effect a loan and apply it to the
premium payment and not pay the government. If the insurer chose the former alternative, and the insured were found not to be liable for the alleged tax deficiency
which formed the basis for the lien and levy, then the insurer would be liable to
the insured for breach of contract on the cancelled policy. If, on the other hand, the
insurer chose to effect such a loan and apply it to the premium payments in accordance
with the insurance contract and the insured were found in fact to be deficient in his
tax, then the insurer would be liable to the government to the extent of the premium
loans under the penalty provision of the INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6332(b). These
would be the inequitable results of a rule that considered the cash surrender value
to be property as of the date notice of levy was served.
20. Note that the same result would be obtained were the problem analyzed in
terms of executed and executory contracts rather than in terms of the cash surrender
value having a sum certain or no sum certain. Were the insurance contract executed,
the cash surrender value would, by definition, be a sum certain. Thus where the
insured died or surrendered the policy, the contract would be executed and the cash
surrender value would be certain. Conversely, prior to death or surrender the contract
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tive, cases which hold the cash surrender value to be property against
which a tax lien might arise can be reconciled with those holding
the cash surrender value not to be property on the theory that this
determination is dictated by the availability of a cash surrender value
that is by one means or another fixed in amount. In the leading case
of United States v. Bess,2 1 where a tax lien arose against taxpayerinsured prior to his death, the government lien was held to attach
to the proceeds in the hands of the beneficiary to the extent of the
cash surrender value on the theory that it was property. 22 In another
case, United States v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.' where the insured retained
the policy and was living at the time of the suit, the court held that
the insurer possessed no property of the insured even though the
insured held property rights in the policy to the extent of the cash
surrender value. Despite the superficial contradiction, Aetna is consistent with Bess so long as it is noted that the classification of the
cash surrender value as property depends on the existence of certainty
in determining the monetary worth of the cash surrender value. 24
Thus, with few exceptions,2 5 the cases have uniformally reached the
result, though not expressly, that the cash surrender value is not
property until such time as it becomes fixed in value by surrender
of the policy or by the death of the insured.
In the instant case, Chief Judge Biggs noted that a federal tax
lien arises against property rights created by state law, and found
that under Pennsylvania law insurance policies are property. The
court thereby found that for the purposes of a federal tax lien the
insured has only a power of election as to the cash surrender value
would be executory and the cash surrender value still subject to non-volitional
fluctuation.
While it is with a view toward these factors that most of the cases in this area have
been decided, none of the cases adequately discuss them.
21. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
22. "The insured has the right under the policy contract to compel the insurer to
pay him [the cash surrender value] upon surrender of the policy. This right may
be borrowed against, assigned or pledged. . . . Thus Mr. Bess 'possessed just prior to
his death, a chose in action in the amount stated [i.e. the cash surrender value]
which he could have collected from the insurance companies in accordance with the
terms of the policies.' [Bess v. United States] 243 F.2d 675, 678. It is therefore
clear that Mr. Bess had 'property' or 'rights to property' within the meaning of §
3670 [of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, see note 4 supra], in the cash surrender
value." Id. at 56.
23. 46 F. Supp. 30 (D. Conn. 1942).
24. In Bess death of the insured made the value of the cash surrender certain and
in Aetna the executory nature of the contract meant that no certain value could be
attributed to cash surrender. As a result in Bess the cash surrender %vas property
whereas in Aetna it was not.
An example of the danger of the superficially inconsistent reasoning of Bess and the
class of cases of which Sullivan is representative is offered by United States v. Wilson,
supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 195 F. Supp. 332 (D.NJ. 1961).
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which power is property against which a lien might arise.26 Yet, the
insurer holds no property of the insured until the latter, either

voluntarily or by judicial order, elects to take the cash surrender value.
Rather, the insurer, at all times prior to surrender, is merely an
"obligor of a broadly based chose in action arising out of a substantially executory contract." 7 Turning to the insurer's liability for
policy loans paid prior to actual notice of levy to the insurer, the
court held that since the insured was not obligated to repay the
amounts received as policy loans, they were merely advances on the
cash surrender valuem and hence the government held no prior lien
that would give it a right to these funds even though these advances

took the form of loans on the books of the insurer and the government's lien arose before such advances. That a prohibitive hardship
would be imposed on the insurer by requiring him to search lien
notices throughout the country before advancing such money was also

considered.2 9 Thus, no duty to conserve the insured's policy value for
the benefit of the government arises on behalf of the insurer prior to

his receipt of actual notice of the government levy. In considering
the diminution of the cash surrender value caused by operation of
the automatic premium loan provision after notice of levy was given
to the insurer, the court looked to the effect of notice on the insured's
rights in the policies and found that such notification was not a
legally effective step sufficient to exercise the insured's rights to
revoke the automatic premium loan provision.
26. This finding was predicated on United States v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130,
F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1942).
27. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 110-11. The court distinguished
Bess on its facts saying that Bess involved a delinquent taxpayer against whom a lien
arose prior to his death, and on the basis of that pre-existing lien the government sought
to collect from the beneficiary the amount of the deficiency to the extent of the cash
surrender value. It went on to say that, "Since the policies concerned had matured,
no specific question was presented in that case as to the effective relationship between
the contracting parties during the executory phase of the policies' existence." Id. at 111.
28. Id. at 113. The court here relied on Mr. Justice Holmes' majority opinion in
Board of Assessors v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517 (1910), in which he said,
"The so-called liability of the policy holder never exists as a personal liability, it
never is a debt, but merely a deduction in account from the sum that the . . . [insurer]
ultimately must pay .... In substance it is extinct from the beginning, because . . .
it is a payment, not a loan." Id. at 522. See also Williams v. Union Cent. Life Co.,
291 U.S. 170 (1934); Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); First Nat'l
Bank v. State Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1935); Lee v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 56 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Mo. 1944); In re Hirsch, 4 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y.
1933); In re Schwartz' Estate, 369 Pa. 574, 87 A.2d 270 (1952). Cf. Carpenter v.
Commissioner, 322 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1963).
29. It is generally held that notice of levy must be served upon the insurer before
any such duty is imposed on him. See Rev. Rul. 56-48, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 561,
which requires actual kmowledge of the existence of a tax lien on the insured's policy on
behalf of the insurer before any duty is imposed on th6 insurer to conserve the insured's
funds for the government.
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The court considered the "rough and ready"3 0 nature of distraint3'

and found the language of section 6337 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954,32 which gives the owner of distrained property a right of

redemption, to suggest that where other procedures were available,
in this case foreclosure, distraint was not intended to be used,
especially when it would have the effect, as here, of destroying
property. 3 The court, for reasons of fairness to the beneficiary, was

also reluctant to terminate his expectancy of proceeds and held that
the Commissioner's notice of levy to the insurer was not legally effective to exercise the insured's revocation rights, therefore, the insurer
was not liable for the statutory penalty. 1 The court concluded that
since the cash surrender value was not property for the purpose of the
30. This phrase was used in United States v. Stock Yards Bank, 231 F.2d 628 (6th
Cir. 1956): "distraint is a rough and ready remedy. This short cut form of self-help
developed by the common law has been available to the government in pursuit of
delinquent taxpayers since the eighteenth century. . . . Where the value and nature
of the taxpayer's property rights are not in question, distraint is no doubt a useful
tool in the effective enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws. But it is a blunt
instrument, ill-adapted to carve out property interests where their nature and extent
are unclear." Id. at 631. See generally Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 2,59-60
(1935); United States v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 23, at 37.
31. To destrain is "to take as a pledge property of another, and keep it until he
performs his obligation...." BLAcx, LAw DiCToNAny 561 (4th ed. 1951).
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 6337, which contains no substantial changes from the
previous law, reads as follows:
"(a) BFxORE SAL-E.-Any person whose property has been levied upon shall have
the right to pay the amount due, together with the expenses of the proceeding, if
any, to the Secretary or his delegate at any time prior to the sale thereof, and upon
such payment the Secretary or his delegate shall restore such property to him, and
all further proceedings in connection with the levy on such property shall cease from
the time of such payment.
"(b) REDE rIoN OF REAL EsTAT AFR SALE.(1) PamoD.-The owners of any real property sold as provided in section 6335,
their heirs, executors, or administrators, or any person having any interest therein, or a
lien thereon, or any person in their behalf, shall be permitted to redeem the property
sold or any particular tract of such property at any time within 1 year after the sale
thereof.
(2) PsucE.-Such property or tract of property shall be permitted to be redeemed upon
payment to the purchaser, or in case he cannot be found in the county in which the
property to be redeemed is situated, then to the Secretary or his delegate, for the use
of the purchaser, his heirs, or assigns, the amount paid by such purchaser and interest
therein at the rate of 20 percent per annum.
(c) REcoRD.-When any lands sold are redeemed as provided in this section, the
Secretary or his delegate shall cause entry of the fact to be made upon the record
mentioned in section 6340, and such entry shall be evidence of such redemption."
33. The property that would be destroyed in this case is of course the property
represented by the incidents of ownership in the policy, i.e., the insured's right to
dividends, to borrow on the policy, etc., and the beneficiary's right to proceeds. See
Sullivan v. United States, supra note 1, at 117: "The application of the remedy of
levy and distraint against insurers with respect to unmatured insurance contracts would
be unique, therefore, in that such action would result in a fait accompli, the insurance
contracts and the interests therein being extinguished."
34. See note 4 supra.
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tax lien until reduced to a sum certain, the amount by which the
cash surrender value was reduced due to the operation of the contract,
and not from volitional acts by the insured, subsequent to the notice
35
of levy filed with the insurer, is not available to the government.
From a theoretical viewpoint Sullivan is probably an incorrect
decision. Presumably an insurance policy consists of an insurance
element for use in case of premature death and an investment element
for use during life. The latter has useable value that is conveniently
liquid. If savings accounts36 or even accounts receivable3 7 are "property or rights to property" why should not the insured's cash surrender
value also be property? The court answered this question with practical considerations and, by giving deference to such matters, found
a new and conect basis for its decision. Chief Judge Biggs recognized
that the right to a cash surrender value does not exist in a vacuum like
a savings account; that it is inextricably involved with other rights
held by other people unlike an account receivable; and that its
pre-mature exercise would so re-arrange the just expectations of three
parties as to allow the cash surrender value a temporary immunity
from the federal tax lien. By recognizing these subtlties, the decision
gained the substantive capacity to clarify a confusing area of the
law. Yet insofar as it failed to articulate the "sum-certain" principle
furnished by the line of authority on which it relied, the court has done
a disservice to the law. Bess contained language 39 that, because of
its ambiguity, could reasonably have been used to justify conclusions
other than those which were reached. This court perceived this
difficulty and in doing so avoided the trap offered by Bess, but still it
failed to warn others. So long as courts and lawyers fully comprehend
the principle of the Sullivan decision, few questions concerning the
availability of life insurance policies to satisfy their owner's federal
tax debts will find their way to court, but one misunderstanding
comparable to that in Wilson4 ° will require another Sullivan case. It
is unfortunate that by neglecting this opportunity to furnish the
clear, definitive order necessary in this field, Chief Judge Biggs has
laid the seeds of future litigation of the same problem.
35. Thus filing notice of levy with the insurer is tantamount to freezing the insured's
assets to the extent of the insurance policy. Still the policy is frozen only insofar as
the insured might manipulate it. To the extent that the policy would operate without
the insured's direct involvement, it will continue to operate.
36. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940); United
States v. Webster Record Corp., 208 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v.
Bowery Say. Bank, 185 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
37. See, e.g., In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960); Wolverine Ins. Co. v.
Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
38. See note 19 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the sum certain
principle.
39. Supra note 22.
40. See text at note 13 supra.
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Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Deductibility
of Worthless Security Losses and the
"Going Concern" Test
Petitioner Ainsley Corporation owned stock in Santa Clara Frosted
Foods Company, a processor of frozen foods. The latter sustained
severe operating losses in 1956, 1957, and 1958, although operations
in all previous years had produced profits. Its balance sheet in 1958
reflected assets having a fair market value of 184,233 dollars and
liabilities of 390,244 dollars.' In 1958, the stockholders, Ainsley (925
shares) and William Lloyd (1375 shares), closed Santa Clara's single
plant, released its employees, and liquidated its inventory, all the
while diligently attempting to sell the business. Not until October
1959, did these efforts to sell Santa Clara bear fruit, at which time
Seabrook Farms Company acquired Santa Clara through a corporate
reorganization. Under the terms of the reorganization, Ainsley cancelled Santa Clara's principal and interest payments of 74,750 dollars
overdue on Ainsley's secured loan to Santa Clara;2 Ainsley accepted
an unsecured, non-interest bearing note of 255,000 dollars for the
balance of the loan; and Seabrook received an option to buy Ainsley's
925 shares of stock for 10,000 dollars. Santa Clara issued additional
capital stock to Seabrook in exchange for certain trade names and
became wholly controlled by Seabrook in 1960 when Seabrook
exercised the options acquired from the former stockholders. In its
tax return for the year ending December 31, 1958, Ainsley claimed
a worthless security deduction of 102,770 dollars, its basis in the
Santa Clara stock.3 The Commissioner's disallowance of this deduc1. From the Tax Court findings of fact, the following may be set forth:
Santa Clara Balance Sheet
December 31, 1958
(Fair Market Value Basis)
$ 22,542.56
Current assets
Plant, property, and equipment
161,690.64
(net of accumulated depreciation)
$184,233.20
Total assets
Loan due Ainsley, secured by deed of
$350,000.00
trust on plant and equipment
40,243.87
Other liabilities
390,43.87
Total liabilities
( 206,010.67)
Stockholders' equity (deficit)
$184,233.20
Total Liabilities and equity
2. When Santa Clara's operating losses began to impair its solvency, Ainsley loaned
it funds of $100,000 in 1956, $50,000 in early 1957, and $200,000 later in 1957.
3. INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 provides: "(a) GENERAL oxLE.-There shall be
allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise.... (g) WoRTHL-ss SncurmnTs.-(1) GENERAL RULE.-
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tion was upheld by the Tax Court,4 which reasoned that Santa Clara's
efforts to sell its business for a price of 350,000 dollars, an amount in
excess of the value of its tangible assets, indicated that the business
had a going-concern value which would attach directly to the stock,
thereby giving it some value greater than zero at the end of 1958;
furthermore, the actual disposition of Santa Clara in 1959 confirmed
the existence of a going-concern value. On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed. The deduction is allowed.
Santa Clara's shutdown of its plant and its decision to go out of
business met the identifiable events test of Regulations section 1.1651(b) 5 in the year 1958. Even if the business had going-concern
value, such value when added to its tangible assets was still less than
its liabilities, leaving no residual net worth for its stockholders. The
Ainsley Corporationv. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1964).
The taxpayer must deduct worthless security losses for the year
during which they are actually sustained, but the determination of
the year of deductibility poses two principal problems for him. First,
he must demonstrate the factual existence of total worthlessnes at the
end of the taxable year, since a deduction for partial worthlessness is
not allowed. 6 Essentially, a corporate security is worthless if the
corporation's liabilities exceed its assets, properly valued. 7 If liabilities
exceed the value of the corporation's tangible assets, the corporation
is said to be insolvent. Although stock in an insolvent corporation
has no current liquidating value, it still may not be worthless if the
corporation has a reasonable8 expectation of future earnings. 9 Such
expectations, when capitalized, constitute the "potential value" or
"going-concern value" of the corporate business.10 Reasonable expecIf any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless during the taxable year,
the loss resulting therefrom shall, for the purpose of this subtitle, be treated as a loss
from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset."
4. The Ainsley Corporation, 22 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 889 (1963).
5. "(b) NATuRE OF LOSS ALLowABLE. To be allowable as a deduction under section
165(a), a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and . . . actually sustained during the taxable year." Treas. Reg. §
1.165-1(b) (1960).
6. Stewart E. Earle, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1181 (1950); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(b),
(c), (d) (1960).
7. Reading Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1942). The crux of the idea
is the absence of residual stockholders' equity. Morton, 38 B.T.A. 1270 (1938), aff'd,
112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1940).
8. "The Taxing Act does not require the taxpayer to be an incorrigible optimist."
United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398, 403 (1927). Other cases
delineate "foolish optimism." Rassieur v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1942);
Walter H. Goodrich & Co., Inc., 40 B.T.A. 960 (1939).
9. Cooley Butler, 45 B.T.A. 593 (1941). The taxpayer must show that the stock has
no potential value as well as no liquidating value. William A. Sipprell, 21 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 491,494 (1962).
10. Going-concern value was originally defined in Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co.,
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tation of capital recovery through reorganization is another component

of the potential value of a corporation." Therefore, a security is
worthless only if corporate liabilities exceed the fair market value of

the tangible assets plus the potential value of the corporation.
Secondly, by pointing to one or more objective events, the taxpayer

must show that worthlessness occurred in the taxable year, not in
some prior year. The events are usually of a nature which terminate
the corporation's economic activity, e.g., liquidation, dissolution, bank-

ruptcy, receivership, sale of the corporate assets, or simply a cessation

from doing business.' 2 Other events identifying year of loss may

be characterized as illustrating management or stockholder expectations for the enterprise, e.g., abandonment of corporate properties,

discontinuance of necessary stockholder advances to the corporation,
or a termination of operations. 3 Prolonged operating losses may
decisively buttress dismal expectations. 14 Depending on the factual
situation, one or more of these events coupled with insolvency should
establish worthlessness in the taxable year, provided, of course, that

212 U.S. 1, 9 (1908), as "an expression of the added value of the plant as a whole
over the sum of the values of its component parts, which is attached to it because it
is an active and successful operation and earning a return."
Quantifying expectations is a difficult problem in both economic and legal literature.
The classic statement of the Treasury position is found in A.R.M. 34, 2 Cu. BULL.
31 (1919). The rule of thumb to guide quantification there suggested is to separate
average annual earnings over the prior five years into two components: return on
tangible assets (suggested to be ten per cent of their value) and return on intangible
assets (represented by the residual). Potential value may be capitalized at roughly five
times the latter. A more sophisticated statement of the economic criteria to be considered in evaluating the worth of securities of closely held corporations may be found
in Rev. RUl. 59-60, 1959 INT. RFv. BUrLL. No. 9, at 8-15. That statement is directed to
estate and gift tax evaluation problems, but its relevance to worthless security problems
is obvious. However, specific reference to either the ruling or to A.R.M. 34 is seldom
found in the case law of worthless security losses.
11. Polizzi v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1959), though recognizing the
analytical rule, held no potential value. Although partial recovery may occur due to
subsequent events, the reorganization potential or the operations potential must be
reasonably foreseeable at the end of the year the deduction is claimed. M. Thompson,
10 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1009 (1941).
12. One of the leading cases points out that these events will foreclose the "reasonable hope and expectation that [the corporate security] will become valuable at some
future time." Morton, supra note 7, at 1278.
If an asset sale is authorized by the stockholders, such that at the price sought, the
proceeds would not satisfy the corporation's debts, the year of worthlessness is the year
of authorization, not the year of sale. Henry Adamson, 17 B.T.A. 17 (1929). Cf.
Joseph C. Lincoln, 24 T.C. 669 (1955), aff'd on other grounds, 242 F.2d 748 (6th
Cir. 1957).
13. For an extensive listing of cases discussing these factors see 5 MraTENs,
FEnmAAL INcoum TAXA'TON § 28.67 (1963 rev.). See especially Industrial Rayon
Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1938), and Fairbanks Morse & Co. v.
Harrison, 63 F. Supp. 495 (N.C. Ill. 1945), in which the courts held that the
securities of an insolvent corporation became worthless in the year in which operations
ceased.
14. Squier v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1933).
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the stock had worth at the close of the prior year.
The Tax Court in the principal case found a going-concern value,
although the corporation had ceased operations in the taxable year.
Stockholder efforts to sell Santa Clara for 350,000 dollars, a price
well beyond the fair market value of its tangible assets, indicated
a potential value, which, in the Tax Court's opinion, attached directly
to the stock. 15 The circuit court, while conceding the existence of a
16 reasoned that it could
potential value, whatever the reason for it,
not exceed the 206,000 dollars excess of liabilities over tangible
assets.17 The higher court discounted the 1958 price tag of 350,000
dollars as nothing more than a figure at which haggling over price
might begin; even at that price, there would have been nothing after
debt payments left for a stockholder distribution. 8 The government's insistence on the importance of the 1959 sale and 1960 option
exercise as evidence of value in Santa Clara stock in 1958 was
summarily dismissed by the court: "The government's argument ...
seems to us to contradict the admonition of its Regulation Sec.
1.1651-1 which says . . . 'Substance and not mere form shall
govern .... "'19The decision to go out of business in 1958, coupled
with the corporation's insolvency, constituted the identifiable event.
From the case law there emerges a basic analytical theory which
must be recognized if its usage is to produce accurate judicial evaluation of widely variant, complex factual situations. Unfortunately,
the theory tends to become obscured by such oft-repeated phrases
as "worthlessness is a question of fact to be established in each case," 20
calling for the exercise of "practical judgment"2 1 in a test of "reasonableness, common sense and economic reality." 22 . The theory, as it
relates to stock not traded on an exchange or in an over-the-counter
market, is founded upon an uncomplicated relationship. Stock repre15. Supra note 4, at 893.
16. The Ainsley Corporation v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, at 557.

17. Id. at 557.
18. Id. at 558.
19. Id. at 559. The court is here referring to the terms of sale whereby Ainsley
received $265,000 (a $255,000 unsecured note upon reorganization and $10,000 cash
when the option was exercised) in exchange for the secured note of $329,750 and the
stock held by Ainsley before reorganization. The net loss suffered by Ainsley in the
transaction was $64,750 ($329,750 minus $265,000) assuming the stock had a zero
basis, having become worthless in 1958. On the other hand, if the stock had value
in 1958, Ainsley's loss in 1959 would have been larger. The contradiction in the
Commissioner's position is evident. The foregoing is the substance; the form is the
Commissioner's contention that the terms of reorganization assigned a price to the
stock, thus indicating a market value. But the terms of reorganization were merely
a formal way of arriving at a selling price of the business, the substantive impact of
which was clearly to negative any existence of stockholder equity in the corporation.
20. 5 MEmR__s, supranote 13, § 28.65, at 287 & n.8.
21. Id. n.10.
22. Ibid
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sents the owners' equity in a corporation. Equity is determined by
the excess in value of the corporation's assets, both tangible and intangible, over the sum of its obligations. If liabilities exceed assets,
the worth of the corporation is nil; ergo, the corporation's stock is
without value. Once both liabilities and tangible assets 23 are assigned dollar amounts, the only determinant of stock value remaining
unquantified is the value of intangible assets, which by their very
nature resist quantification. Reluctance and inability to assign definite values to intangible assets has perhaps led the courts to oversimplify in asserting that going-concern value attaches directly to
the stock, when, in fact, it does so only to the extent that it is greater
than the net excess of liabilities over tangible assets. Oversimplification breeds error, as in the instant opinion of the Tax Court.
Similarly invalid is the oft-repeated assertion that stock in a going
concern cannot be worthless. The most troublesome component of
potential, or going-concern, value is owner- or purchaser-expectations
concerning future corporate earnings, especially in view of previous
operating losses. Virtually the only applicable generality of merit
here is that the owner must not be an incorrigible optimist. Only
within this narrow context is it proper to assert pragmatically that
each case must rest upon its own facts. Further, a guide for judicial
evaluation of the dollar range within which this component of potential value is crucial can be set forth with some precision.2 4 Other
components of potential value might more easily be quantified:
present discounted values could usually be assigned to such intangibles as operating-loss carryovers, investment credit carryovers, longterm leases, patents with earnings histories, and distribution, supply,
and employment agreements. Recognition of the variables here mentioned within their proper analytical context is necessary for adequate
determination of stock worth or lack of worth.
23. Seldom do the problems of liability determination (typical of which is whether
or not a corporation's note payable to its stockholder is merely a contribution of capital)
or of the determination of tangible asset fair market value (a different problem area
which has many unsettled questions-see, for example, parts of Revenue Ruling 59-60,
supra note 10) arise in litigation concerning loss deductions for worthless securities.
For that reason, these problems are beyond the scope of this comment.
24. To illustrate the meaning of this crucial range, we might assume the following
facts. Liabilities are stipulated to be $100,000; fair market value of tangible assets is
stipulated to be $40,000; present discounted value of intangibles such as operating-loss
carryovers is $25,000. Thus the crucial range is $35,000 ($100,000 minus $25,000 minus
$40,000). Under the rule-of-thumb suggested by A.R.M. 34, this represents average
annual earnings over the next several years of something in excess of $7,000 ($35,000
plus a discount factory, divided by five). Supra note 10. Thus we have arrived at a
rough standard of performance which the business must meet if it may be said to have
present positive worth. (It is possible that the tools of econometrics, the mathematical
science of measuring economic variables of just this nature, might be employed to give
greater precision to this estimate.)

